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In Experiment in Autobiography, Wells hails A Modern Utopia as “the most Platonic of my books”.1 
What does this mean? Wells did not write that it was a ‘modern Republic’ though he borrowed ideas 
of government from Republic explicitly with no reference made to any of Plato’s other dialogues. 
Instead he placed it beneath the more generalised banner; “Platonic”. In this thesis I will seek to 
understand what implications “Platonic” bears for those authors who seek to appropriate it, what 
significances - perhaps unintended - this lends to aspects of the text. Once an understanding of the 
Platonic reading has been acquired, I hope to regard two modern texts which place themselves within 
the tradition of Plato’s dialogues – Wells’ A Modern Utopia and Huxley’s Brave New World. It will 
be seen that these two texts experiment with certain utopian themes found in the philosophy of Plato’s 
dialogues. By re-examining these texts in the light of what I will understand to be a Platonic reading, I 
hope to catch a glimpse of the Platonic reading ‘in the wild’. I hope that by following the Platonic 
reading through the text I will arrive at a greater understanding, not only of the modern texts but also 
of the dialogues and Plato’s ideals, his Forms, his Utopia. 
This thesis represents a contribution to the philosophy of the perfect world. ‘Utopia’ is rooted in the 
Greek outopia or ‘no place’ but it also originates in eutopia or ‘good place’, hinting at the obstacle in 
the passage from ideal to physical topos or ‘place’.  A word-play conceived centuries ago by the 
English cleric Thomas More in his novel Utopia. As will be seen in the implicit condemnation of 
Classical Athenian government (Plato’s dialogues), twentieth century world government (Wells’ 
utopian texts) and the materialistic culture of 1920 America (Huxley’s Brave New World), utopianism 
is versatile. To help reach an understanding of the ‘Platonic’ I will seek to use these modern texts to 
bring to the fore different characteristics of the ‘Platonic’. I will also demonstrate that whilst Plato’s 
dialogues can be used to inform modern utopian fiction so, retroactively, these modern utopian texts 
can illuminate our understanding of the dialogues too – their relationship being symbiotic. 
                                                            
1 Wells 1934:185. 
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This simultaneous commentary on the grand Utopian quest and contemporary trends is the reason for 
Utopian literature’s continuing relevance.2 To best understand success, failure must also be studied 
which in this case means Dystopia – the failed quest for the perfect society. A primary critic of Plato’s 
vision, calling it a corrupted and failed Utopian, project was the twentieth century academic Karl 
Popper.3 However, this thesis will argue that in this apparent failure the Utopia gains its greatest 
strength, that this failure is epitomised in the sometimes bafflingly inconclusive conclusion of many 
of Plato’s dialogues. 
The desire for a conclusion and so a final image of Utopia will be seen to be undermined in all the 
texts by the same tension; that between the rights of the individual and those of the collective. The 
tension between the individual and State is profoundly relevant to our own time but has its roots in the 
Romantic rebuttal of the Enlightenment.4 The Romantic Movement opposed the State and its 
requirement for the subordination of the individual to ‘the greater good’.5 As well as the Wellsian 
utopias and Huxley’s dystopia providing a laboratory for these tensions to react, reference will be 
made to Plato’s Republic in how it negotiated this tension between individual and the collective. The 
beliefs of Socrates - as he is characterised in Plato’s Republic and other dialogues - of what makes the 
perfect personality and how this individual is to relate to the community at large - will help uncover 
the significance of the self-conscious positioning of the modern texts within the Platonic tradition. 
The foundation of this thesis is that Plato’s individual dialogues are not self-sufficient. Instead, I will 
regard them as existing in an epistemological web. Hermeneutic readings of the dialogues will help 
reinforce the mutual reliance of Plato’s dialogues. Hermeneutic emphasis on understanding the 
significance of the relationship between the single word and the wider language also provides a fitting 
analogy for the nature of a single Platonic dialogue and the Platonic corpus. Two instances in the 
dialogues hint at this Platonic meta-philosophy. In Phaedrus, Plato’s Socrates refers to texts as ‘track 
                                                            
2 Finley 1967: 5. 
3 Sargisson 2007: 28. 
4 Shklar 1969:68. 
5 Shklar 1969: 74. 
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aid’ (‘ichnos’)6 which arguably mean that each written dialogue represents a ‘track aid’. No dialogue 
represents a complete argument or path but is instead a milestone along the same path. The physical 
scenes of many of the dialogues also help support this idea (the journey down to the Piraeus in 
Republic,7 the journey to Pythodorus’ lodgings “outside of the wall” to speak with Zeno8 and the walk 
from the city of Athens to the river Ilissos in Phaedrus9 provide some of examples). Chronological 
settings, featuring historical characters, locate the dialogues within the lifetime of Socrates. This binds 
the dialogues together. Socrates’ ironic tone when speaking with his interlocutors can be understood 
as a deliberate component of Socrates’ message. This irony effectively illustrates that we cannot take 
the superficial events of the text at face value but that there is a deeper argument which undermines 
it.10 This will resonate with the hermeneutics explained later in this thesis as well as the final chapter. 
As Socrates gestures towards Utopia we will look to see what similarities exist with Wells and 
Huxley’s own utopian visions and what these differing accounts uncover in Socrates’ utopian musings 
recorded in Plato’s dialogues. This thesis’ first milestone will be the hermeneutics of Gadamer and 
Derrida and their understanding of Socrates’ own beliefs about the nature of communication as laid 
down in the dialogues Gorgias, Cratylus and Phaedrus. We will then move to the fictional motifs of 
the dialogues; the physical setting (alluded to above) and the characters which participate. Though I 
acknowledged above that the physical settings are identifiable geographical locations, and the 
characters themselves are historical, Plato himself is not recorded as being present during any of the 
dialogues. The dialogues can therefore be, at best, the imperfect recollections of interlocutors for 
whom - in some cases - the dialogue happened long ago. One case is found in Parmenides where the 
dialogue is acknowledged as a recollection from years before when Socrates was still “very young”.11 
Parmenides is not even an account from one of those present but is actually the recital of an earlier 
                                                            
6 Plato Phaedrus: 276d. 
7 Plato Republic: 327a. 
8 Plato Parmenides: 127c. 
9 Plato Phaedrus: 229a. 
10 Booth’s Rhetoric of Irony lucidly argues Socrates’ irony to be indispensable to any understanding of Plato’s 
dialogues. 
11 Plato Parmenides: 127c. 
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recital by one of those present when the dialogue took place.12 Uncertainty of mooring in real world 
conversations or whether historic Socrates would have supported the arguments of Plato’s Socrates 
will emerge as an important factor in the Platonic reading and the idea of his inconclusive ending. 
When a new component of the Platonic reading is uncovered, the Wellsian utopian texts (A Modern 
Utopia and Men Like Gods) which claim Platonic heritage will be referred to as much as possible. 
These texts will be experimental environments where the effects of subscription to the Platonic 
tradition will be evaluated. Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World similarly features ideas and concerns 
raised in Plato’s dialogues. Tensions arising from the philosophical toll demanded for membership by 
the community presents itself when John (the outsider in Brave New World) is encouraged to escape 
his unease with the state of society by taking a state distributed drug and so leave his concerns 
unresolved.13 Socrates anticipated a similar tension between the philosophic statesmen and an un-
philosophic polis.14 The tension of the individual versus society as well as the importance both 
Socrates and John place in failure as an event which tempers the human drive towards self-
improvement will bring these two texts together and validate the comparison. Huxley’s vision 
provides a singular spectacle of Socrates’ self-appointed task to excite the thought of his fellow 
citizens out of their habitual ruts. These Platonic texts will provide an opportunity to observe the 
ideological landscape left by Plato’s dialogues. Through this I hope to arrive at a greater 
understanding of the ‘Platonic utopia’, the Platonic text and the ‘Platonic’ in general. 
                                                            
12 Plato Parmenides: 126c. 
13 Huxley 1963:173. 
14 Plato Republic: 592a. 
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1. The Idea of Meaning 
 
At the end of the dialogue Lysis Socrates dismisses his conclusions on friendship decrying 
“what a “friend” is, we have not yet discovered”.15 Here Socrates demonstrates his reticence 
in using a word before he has properly understood its meaning, dismissing the philosophy 
which it has inspired. Definition of the terminology used is shown to be one of Socrates’ 
primary philosophic criteria (it is the singular focus in Cratylus).16 The Republic’s Line 
Metaphor illustrates the incremental progression from belief to truth rooted in a 
comprehensive understanding of the language used to articulate a truth.17 The metaphor 
shows that meaning cannot be wholly understood with a cursory glance but instead “every 
word causes the whole of the language to which it belongs to resonate” because “the word of 
language is both one and many”.18 This chapter will look at the different devices brought to 
bear by Socrates to understand how meaning attaches to a word and how this informs the 
reading of his dialogues and texts which claim to use his vocabulary. The chapter will 
introduce the idea of the system in which the written text operates (Hermeneutics) and what 
effect this has on the form of the ‘Platonic’. The hermeneutic perspectives regarding the 
correct reading of Plato’s dialogues will help reinforce the compelling arguments for the 
dialogues’ own concern with the nature of the relationship between a word and its meaning. 
The approach to textual criticism which the dialogues may then be understood to offer will 
contribute to our aim of gaining a comprehensive understanding of the nature of Platonic text. 
In The City and Man Leo Strauss argues that the dialogic format of the Platonic texts is as 
much a part of their philosophic lesson as the ideas Socrates elucidates.19 Strauss regards the 
                                                            
15 Plato Lysis: 223b. 
16 Plato Republic: 331c. 
17 Plato Republic: 509e. 
18 Gadamer 2005:454. 
19 Strauss 1978: 52. 
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quest to understand meaning not only being a philosophy in itself but also containing the 
explanation of society’s relationship with philosophy.20 As will be seen, Socrates was 
similarly concerned with the semantic instability of language (by virtue of dialectic solely 
existing within the language of the interlocutors) and how this influenced the communication 
of one’s views and ideas. Socrates confronts the ontology of the word more directly in few 
other places than in his notorious treatment of the poets. 
Funerary Games and Poetic Truth 
 
Socrates states in book ten of Republic that “there’s an ancient quarrel between poetry and 
philosophy”21 as he advances from Philosophy’s lines. The central unease Plato’s Socrates 
has with the poets is most famously explained in Republic in which he voices a distrust of 
those who make their livelihoods out of imitation of historical figures or the telling of 
fictional stories.22 But this attack is by no means restricted to Republic, additional volleys are 
loosed in Phaedrus23, Cratylus24 and Ion.25  
Ion in particular shows Socrates trying to discern the nature of the knowledge the rhaspsodes 
(those who travelled throughout Greece reciting the epics) professed to understand. Socrates 
reveals Ion’s belief in the superiority of Homer’s poetry to be baseless by showing that he 
cannot know whether these poets describe techne (the art of doing something like carving or 
chariot racing) accurately.  The technical inaccuracy of Homer’s description of the chariot 
races at the funerary games of Patroclus provides the support for Socrates assertion that 
                                                            
20 Strauss 1978: 52. 
21 Plato Republic: 607b. 
22 Plato Republic: 605a. 
23 Plato Phaedrus: 276c. 
24 Plato Cratylus: 402b. 
25 Plato Ion: 530c. 
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Homer does not understand his own story.26 Socrates accuses Ion of being unqualified to 
judge the quality of Homer since Ion cannot know the accuracy of Homer’s descriptions – in 
this case – the techne of Chariot Racing but in the wider context, any art that is not poetry 
recital. This is because his expertise does not extend beyond his profession of oratory and so 
any opinion he holds on the overall quality of Homer’s poetry can only ever be an opinion. In 
this instance Socrates provides an illustrative example of the flawed understanding which he 
is warning against. 
Returning to the Republic, the concern of distinguishing between flawed understanding and 
accurate understanding is elaborated. The Greek word for artistic representation is Mimesis 
which has no precise English translation but may be equated with ‘enactment’.27 Socrates 
devoted considerable attention to the mimetic technique of Artists in the explanation of the 
metaphor of the ‘Couch’ in which he demarcates the different stages of removal from the 
original Logos – in this case a Couch. The initial stage of its existence is as an immaterial 
concept existing in the abstract realm of Forms. The next stage is the apprehension and 
understanding of this True Couch by a philosophical mind, at this stage the nature of the 
Couch is still essentially pure and abstract. The degradation of the concept only begins when 
the Carpenter takes the image and constructs a physical manifestation. Finally the lowest, 
most aesthetic– and therefore most dangerous - manifestation of the Couch is when it is 
represented in a painting. No matter how this is done it is only a single aspect of the object on 
the Artist’s canvas. Socrates states that in this form it may most easily be misunderstood and 
lead one astray in their understanding of the "essential nature"28 of the Couch29 to imperfect 
Belief. Seeking to understand the stages of the scale stretching between Belief and Truth 
                                                            
26 Plato Ion: 538b. 
27 Farness 2003: 107. 
28 Plato Phaedrus: 237c. 
29 Plato Republic: 596e. 
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occupies much of Socrates’ thought in Republic and contributes to the questions which 
produce the Cave30, Line31 and Sun32 metaphors which have subsequently become some of 
the most famous extracts of Republic.33 Whether these three metaphors can be taken together 
to explain Socrates’ epistemology or are intended to be self-sufficient in their individual 
messages is not so easy to answer.34 Their plotting of the positions of belief and knowledge in 
relation to each other is elaborate and unfortunately their explanation would be too expansive 
to provide in this essay. There is a broad and easily accessed scholarship which will provide 
such an analysis but for the time being we must be content with the conclusion that Socrates 
identified a marked distinction between knowledge and belief and that belief arose from an 
imperfect understanding of knowledge.  
This deception leads to Republic producing the Artist as the most potent example of Mimesis. 
The aim of the Artist is antithetical to that of Socrates, seeking to indulge the emotional drive 
of his audience’s mind without reasoning whether this enjoyment is morally beneficial. His 
objective is pleasure rather than truth, which should be the aim of all those who profess 
wisdom.35 This concern for demarcating the different forms of understanding - truth and 
opinion - is a recurrent theme not only in Republic but also in many of the other dialogues. 
The ontology of language is dissected further in three other dialogues – Gorgias¸ Phaedrus 
and Protagoras. 
                                                            
30 Annas 1981:253 
31 Annas 1981:248. 
32 Annas 1981:247. 
33 Annas 1981:252. 
34 Annas 1981:254 
35 Plato Republic: 607a. 




The Magic Word 
 
Both Socrates’ dialogues Protagoras and Gorgias look at the power of language’s 
manipulation for unscrupulous and morally harmful ends. In Gorgias this is seen in Socrates’ 
discomfort when the eponymous rhetorician Gorgias concedes that the rhetorician’s sole aim 
is the audience’s acceptance of his opinion, regardless of the veracity of that opinion.36 The 
historical character of Gorgias conceded that the objective of each rhetorician is simply and 
exclusively to win the debate.37 Socrates understands the ‘knack’38 of Gorgias to be that of 
defending oneself in court39 regardless of the moral implications of the arguments used in the 
defence. Socrates came to regard rhetoricians as dangerously selfish,40 seeking to have the 
audience adopt his own Logos rather than improving their understanding of the truth and 
therefore unworthy of their power to influence. 
By way of adding additional depth to Socrates’ opinion of the rhetoricians and their 
‘knack’,41 the word Socrates uses  to denote these wordsmiths (‘rhetorike’) has been argued 
to be vocabulary of his own fashioning. Schiappa initially pointed to the word itself being 
characteristic of much of the philosophic vocabulary which Plato coined to help articulate his 
ideas.42 Schiappa goes on to argue that Plato coined the term to help neutralise the possible 
confusion in his use of ‘Sophist’, whether he is referring to the ancient wisemen (such as 
Heraclitus, Parmenides etc.) or the sham performers of his day whose only object was to win 
                                                            
36 Plato Gorgias: 454. 
37 Consigny 2001: 89. 
38 Plato Gorgias: 463b. 
39 Schiappa 1990: 465. 
40 Murray 2004: 374. 
41 Plato Gorgias: 463b. 
42 Schiappa 1990: 464. 
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the argument rather than morally enrich their audience.43 Schiappa’s choice to accredit Plato 
with the invention of the word rhetorike, however, has proven controversial and provoked 
criticism from Poulakos who not only attacks Schiappa’s research methodology but also cites 
his own research into the etymology of rhetorike which uncovered instances of the word in 
several Greek authors predating Plato.44 Poulakos’ explanation for Schiappa’s lack of success 
in his search is his disregard for the Ancient Greek system of declensions which lends a 
single word several different forms.45 Though Schiappa had no luck in finding the nominative 
singular of rhetorik- its other declensions are very common.46 Poulakos’ detailed description 
of his own research of rhetorik- is a devastating attack on Schiappa’s argument. The 
relevance of Poulakos’ conclusions on rhetorik- to this thesis is their  demonstration that 
Plato’s Gorgias functioned in contemporary debates about the nature of ‘rhetoric’ and that 
the dialogue was a contribution to a wider system of scholarship in the classical world rather 
than just the personal interest of Plato. This therefore justifies reading Gorgias whilst bearing 
the texts of the presocratic sophists (the philosophic context of the time) in mind but also 
reinforces the argument for a systemic arena in which the dialogues interacted and 
participated. It is very likely that Plato will have been familiar with the presocratic 
philosophers’ discussions. The considerable distances which separated many of the Ionian 
presocratics (such as Heraclitus and Protagoras) presented an obstacle to their philosophic 
engagement. By producing their philosophy as texts, they were able reach a larger audience 
as well as their own presocratic peers and so catalyse the philosophic culture that went onto 
to flower throughout the region.47   
                                                            
43 Schiappa 1990: 467. 
44 Poulakos 1990: 222. 
45 Poulakos 1990: 223 
46 Poulakos 1990: 223 
47 Cole 1991: 80. 
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How the pre-existing philosophic landscape came to influence the arguments and conclusions 
which Plato’s Socrates made will now be examined. One of the most blatant influences is in 
the very appearance of one of the leading Presocratic philosophers in their eponymous 
dialogue Protagoras. Continuing our consideration of Socrates’ concern with the degradation 
of truth made possible by speech seen earlier in Gorgias, Protagoras is concerned with the 
possibility that an imperfect knowledge is communicated even when a more complete 
understanding is intended. At one point in the dialogue Protagoras cites an ode by Simonides 
describing how a man may become good after which the characters debate the meaning of the 
word “bad”48 in the poem and perceived inconsistencies in Simonides’ own opinion.49 The 
possibility of unintended meanings being understood, highlighted in this scene by an 
intrigued but nervous young Socrates, is given additional and illuminating attention by two of 
the most influential modern thinkers on hermeneutics – Gadamer and Derrida. 
The flexibility of the audience’s interpretation and Plato’s place within this debate is looked 
at in Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method in which he acknowledges the peculiar 
distinction of the “unique and continuing relevance of the Platonic Dialogues” due to their 
“art of strengthening”.50 In the chapter in which he looks at language as a medium of 
experience he identifies the Greeks as being among the first to believe that “human 
experience of the world is linguistic” and had its origins in the logoi of Plato.51. Gadamer 
views Plato’s interest in this instability of language’s very essence, that is, its (as the Greeks 
would have had it) ‘being’ as the catalyst for the innovative decision to place his ideas within 
the dialogue form. Gadamer further posits that this interest was not appreciated by the 
                                                            
48 Plato Protagoras: 341. 
49 Plato Protagroas: 340. 
50 Gadamer 2004: 361. 
51 Gadamer 2004: 453. 
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sophists which therefore led to Socrates’ distrust of their art.52 Gadamer argues that it was the 
didactic but dogmatic approach of the sophists which turned Plato to fiction as a vehicle for 
philosophy.53  
The sophist’s dogmatic understanding of the nature of knowledge acted to restrain dialectic, 
since if the answer is already known no truly open questioning can take place. This would be 
exacerbated if, as Socrates demonstrates in many cases (such as the speech on Love penned 
by Lysias and read aloud by Phaedrus in the dialogue which carries the latter’s name), the 
answer is based on an imperfect knowledge of the given subject. Such vested and ultimately 
flawed questioning is the antithesis of the pure dialectic Socrates aspires to.54 Rutherford 
writes that there “clearly was not” a Platonic orthodoxy of doctrine or dogma in the 
dialogues.55  
Socrates’ fear of the restraint of dialectic by dogmatism offers a compelling explanation of 
the confusing density in much of the presocratics’ symbolism. The sometimes bewildering 
opacity of the presocratics is arguably epitomised in Heraclitus and earned him the nickname 
‘Dark One’ in Antiquity.56 Even if the continuation of philosophic debate was not the 
objective of Heraclitus’ dense poetry, its effect in producing several antique commentaries 
referenced by ancient authors57 could not have escaped Plato. It is therefore arguable that 
Plato saw in the hints and half explained ideas of Heraclitus’ text which were then 
supplemented by subsequent discussion (the Stoic school being the most prominent 
Heraclitian interpretation pioneered by Zeno a generation later)58 a means by which he could 
guarantee the continued vitality of his philosophy. Socrates’ concern that his texts could 
                                                            
52 Gadamer 2004: 362. 
53 Gadamer 2004: 362. 
54 Gadamer 2004: 368. 
55 Rutherford 1995: 38. 
56 Baldry 1965: 26. 
57 Kahn 1979: 5. 
58 Kahn 1979: 4. 
Student Number: 795827 
15 
 
obstruct the philosophical methodology which he so prized is therefore a plausible 
explanation for the multiple bulwarks between the reader and the opinions of the author - 
“this protects words from all dogmatic abuse”.59 Heraclitus, though, is not the only 
presocratic whose influence can be detected in Plato’s dialogues. 
The Speech of Gorgias of Leontini 
 
The concern of Plato’s Socrates with the semantic instability of language and the resulting 
implications for effective philosophic discussion is not a spark which leapt forth solely for 
Plato. The Philosophers collectively dubbed the Presocratics also gave this idea 
consideration. The philosopher Parmenides, whose writings are the earliest extant 
philosophical works available to us, places at its centre the distinction between the ‘Way of 
Appearance’ and the ‘Way of Truth’.60 In a separate fragment containing a latter part of the 
same poem, (conventionally referred to as fragment DK 28 B 1) a Goddess identifies 
humanity’s nomenclature of the physical world as the “decoration of a name”.61  The 
hermeneutics of Derrida argue that this concern persisted in Republic in Socrates’ use of the 
Greek word pharmakon and its ancient connotations of cosmetic, similarly decorating the 
human form.62 This will be explained more fully later in this chapter. 
Gorgias was another Presocratic who was concerned with the power of the spoken word and 
a rhetorician who features in the eponymous dialogue written by Plato. Gorgias was from 
Leontini in Sicily and was interested in the interpretation of speech, be it verbal or text.63 The 
                                                            
59 Gadamer 2004: 362. 
60 DK 28 B 1: 45-7. 
61 DK 28 B 19. 
62 Derrida 2008: 142. 
63 Waterfield 2000: 223.  
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arguments which may be garnered from the extant fragments of his writings suggest that he 
may have anticipated many of the ideas voiced by Plato’s Socrates. 
As with the dialogues themselves, the texts of Gorgias of Leontini were in a stylised prose 
through which he communicated his philosophy.64 Gorgias pioneered prose as a medium of 
written philosophy at a time when the vast majority of models were composed in verse.65 So 
we see that both Gorgias, and later Plato, departed from the convention of communicating 
wisdom literature in metre and poetry. This tradition is exemplified by Parmenides who 
chooses to convey his arguments within a poem that describes a metaphysical journey to the 
goddess of Knowledge led by two lesser deities.66  
In Gorgias’ Encomium of Helen he, like Plato after him,67 recognised the weakness of poetry 
and metre in communicating logic. Gorgias seems to belittle poetry by writing that it is 
simply “Speech with metre”68 so seeming to argue that speech or poetry are equally effective 
in conveying argument or Logos. I would argue that this actually supports Socrates’ own 
uncertainty about oratorical possibilities accurately conveying a Logos. In the next sentence 
he cites poetry’s unique ability to evoke emotions so that the mind of the listener “feels its 
own personal feelings”.69 This can be read as recognition of the unsuitability of verbal 
communication for rational discourse since both prose and poetry contaminate the meaning 
and distract the audience.  
The recognition of the almost magical and traitorous power of the spoken word is also seen in 
the Homeric epics, in the fatal songs of the Sirens and the wit of Odysseus.70 By linking 
                                                            
64 Waterfield 2000: 223. 
65 Wardy 1996: 40. 
66 D-K 28 B 1. 
67 Waterfield 1998: 605d. 
68 D-K 82 B 11. 
69 D-K 82 B 11. 
70 Constandinidou 2998: 167. 
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words to magic and catharsis, Gorgias evoked what would have been widely recognised as 
Orphic qualities.71 This can be seen to have influenced Plato’s characterisation of Socrates 
whose words, like those of Orpheus, wielded considerable cathartic power.72 Continuing the 
possibility of rhetoric’s very foreign and manipulative influence on meaning, Gorgias argues 
that language’s possible effects on the soul are analogous to that of drugs on the body.73  
Gorgias of Leontini’s Encomium of Helen delineates these rhetorical drugs which can affect 
an audience’s final understanding.  Devoting the first half of his encomium to looking at the 
strength of the spoken word, Gorgias hails it as a “mighty lord” with “superhuman effects”.74 
The Encomium has also been argued to be a demonstration of the elasticity of a word’s 
interpretation, returning us to the opening idea of this chapter – the instability of meaning in 
text that leads to a broad freedom of interpretation. The language of the defences it raises 
against attacks on Helen’s integrity have been interpreted as demonstrating the text to be a 
catalogue of defensive tactics that a defendant may use in court.75 This demonstrates how the 
words for a very specific situation can have their meaning and interpretation extended into 
any number of situations. Here we see the uncertainty of the interpretive action, weighing 
each word as sincere or insincere is highlighted by the words Gorgias chooses to conclude his 
encomium with; “I wanted to write the speech as an encomium to Helen and as an 
amusement to myself”.76 This echoes the call at the end of Phaedrus where Plato has Socrates 
declare that all those who possessed a true knowledge would refrain from taking his thoughts 
and “sowing them through a pen with words which cannot defend themselves”.77 Principally, 
the Encomium exposes the fickle loyalty of language to the intentions of the speaker or 
                                                            
71 Gellrich 1994: 281. 
72 Gellrich 1994: 281. 
73 Karadimas 2008: 14. 
74 D-K 82 B 11. 
75 Cole, T. 1991: 76. 
76 Waterfield 2000: 231. 
77 Plato Phaedrus: 276D. 
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audience. The Encomium provides a contemporary’s acknowledgement of the qualities of 
language which Plato’s Socrates had identified as a threat to his search for truth. Both the 
quotes above from Socrates and Gorgias emphasize the unsuitability of text as a vehicle for 
serious argument. Gorgias (in belittling his previous argument as only an ‘amusement’) and 
Socrates (in warning against the inability of text to defend itself) are both concerned with the 
unsuitability of text as a forum for philosophic debate and argument. 
Summary 
 
The themes introduced in this chapter will recur and be taken further in the following 
chapters. What this chapter has served to do is provide a foundation on which the rest of the 
dissertation can be raised. This chapter has introduced the idea that the semantic reality of 
any word employed in explaining an idea is essentially unstable. 
This chapter opened with a look at the treatment Socrates gives Ion in the eponymous 
dialogue and what concerns Socrates had with Ion’s profession. In this instance the chapter 
showed that the meaning of one’s words can ultimately betray when Ion was proven to be 
unable to defend his assertion that as a rhapsode he was best placed to assess the quality and 
worth of Homer’s poetry. With the idea that one may only have a partial understanding of 
their own words thus introduced, the focus was moved to the Presocratic ideas of Protagoras 
as he is presented in the dialogue named after him. The premise that the dialogues function 
within a wider system taken with the conclusion of the debate between Schiappa and 
Poulakos, was given weight by demonstrating that Socrates’ arguments were part of a wider 
philosophical debate taking place in the Greek world. The introduction of the dialogues 
existence within a wider contemporary debate allowed for another facet of the systemic 
existence of the dialogues to be introduced. This was done with the hermeneutics of Gadamer 
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who introduced the idea that the borders of the meaning attached to single word are 
permeable. 
What we have seen here is that each word in a text must be weighed and consideration given 
to the semantic heritage from which it descends and which it invariably brings in tow. The 
following chapter will demonstrate the extent to which this semantic heritage can influence 
the meaning irrespective of the intended meaning of the author or speaker. When 
acknowledged, the broader field in which the interpretive action functions significantly 
effects how we regard Plato’s dialogues in their relationship to each other as well as our 
understanding of Plato’s ideal state. The next chapter aims to identify the features of the 
interpretive action which mould and sometimes change the apparent meaning of the given 
text.  
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2. Meaning and Interpretation 
 
The previous chapter introduced Plato’s Socrates understanding that ‘meaning’ is multi-
faceted and plastic. This chapter delve deeper into this understanding by looking at how the 
varying significances of a chosen word can drastically affect the philosophy of a text and its 
interpretation by different readers. This will be seen in the dialogues’ Orphic resonances 
which are identified both in Plato’s dialogues and regarded in Huxley’s Brave New World.  
These texts will help demonstrate the significance of the Orphic tradition to the 
understanding of Plato’s Socrates’ philosophy. The interplay of the reader’s tradition with the 
text and the dialogues’ circumspect language will focus more on Socrates’ dialectic and its 
role as a key component of the Platonic text and ideal. 
The Orphics 
 
The basis of this thesis thus far has been that the dialogues and, the texts which seek to 
participate in their legacy, cannot be read simply as a script between characters. The 
participation of a text within a wider tradition was briefly alluded to above, as well as the 
Orphic resonances of Socrates’ characterisation by Plato. Socrates’ discussion of the Orphic 
cult consists of little more than small paragraphs in a handful of his dialogues. But his very 
deliberate references and the supplementation of this with our own knowledge of the cult 
adds weight to Gadamer’s argument that “Plato realized that the word of language is both one 
and many”.78  
The Orphic influence on Plato’s philosophy can be seen to go far deeper than their effect on 
his characterisation of Socrates. Aldous Huxley will be used to introduce the Orphics to this 
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discussion with his decision to name his hallucinogenic drug Soma. The authorities of the 
World State Utopia present this drug as a release from the more taxing cares of life (‘a gram 
is better than a damn’79, ‘one cubic centimetre cures ten gloomy sentiments’)80 Significantly 
the name ‘Soma’ is taken from ancient Greek and is semantically deconstructed by Socrates 
in Cratylus where he describes its most basic meaning as “the tomb of the soul”.81 The 
afterlife, and so Soma, was a central concern of the Orphics.  
We know from sources such as the inscribed bone plaques excavated at Olbia in southern 
Russia,82 and the Orphic Gold Leaves, that the Orphic cult was concerned with the soul and 
its fate after death.83 The Orphic Gold Leaves in particular were buried with a woman in 
Italy84 and contained instructions for the soul upon reaching Hades.85 Additionally, the belief 
that the body is a ‘tomb’ for the soul (sema)86 was also a word play used by the Orphics; 
soma - sema.87 The emphasis on the soul meant that the Orphic initiate believed that salvation 
had to begin in the individual rather than being imposed from without,88 that the ideal Orphic 
lifestyle was at the margins of the institutional Polis or even outside of it.89 This too can be 
seen to have had an influence on Plato’s Socrates’ personal philosophical approach which 
lacked any institutions and instead rested on direct contact with an interlocutor.  
It would be premature to conclude that Socrates sympathised with the explanation of soma – 
sema as stated in Cratylus as well as references to it in Gorgias90 and Phaedo91. Such a 
                                                            
79 Huxley 1963: 53. 
80 Huxley 1963: 77. 
81 Plato Cratylus: 400b. 
82 Price 1999: 119-20. 
83 Price 1999: 120. 
84 Fowler 2000: 320. 
85 Price 1999: 120 
86 Plato Cratylus: 400c. 
87 Brill’s New Pauly. 2007: 254. 
88 Guthrie 1935: 156. 
89 Brill’s New Pauly. 2007: 254. 
90 Plato Gorgias: 493a. 
91 Plato Phaedo: 62b. 
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reading would be tempting for its seeming reconciliation of the tension in Socrates’ belief 
that though the ideal community is one ruled by philosophers, the philosophers will be 
ambivalent towards Politics until the philosophical community is realised.92 Ferwerda 
declares that “most modern scholars agree that Plato presents them [Orphic aetiologies] in 
tongue in cheek”.93 Ferwerda continues, stating that the pessimism of equating the body and 
the “tomb”94 suggests it incarcerating the soul – a belief which figures in the Orphic tradition.  
Sema, Ferwerda argues, may also be interpreted as ‘enclosure’, a place where the soul is 
preserved and protected in preparation for the holy joy of the earthly religious festivals.95 
Ferwerda argues that Plato chose to emphasize the alternate deathly interpretation to criticise 
what he believed to be their esoteric emphasis on the soul to the exclusion of the Polis.96 The 
Cave Metaphor of the Republic stresses the importance of the enlightened philosophers 
returning to the communities and benevolently guiding them, through their laws, to 
enlightenment.97 Earlier in the dialogue, Socrates even stresses the importance of every 
citizen positively contributing to the community’s welfare regardless of whether they are in a 
position of government.98 Furthermore, Plato has his Athenian character state in Laws that 
“legislation and the settlement of States are tasks that require men perfect above all other men 
in goodness”99 implying that good government is the most noble undertaking anyone can 
perform. Here Socrates is emphasizing the insufficiencies of isolated philosophising. Instead, 
the Truth of the Forms can only be approached through human political society.  
                                                            
92 Plato Republic: 592a-b. 
93 Ferwerda 1985: 268. 
94 Plato Gorgias: 493. 
95 Ferwerda 1985:274. 
96 Ferwerda 1985: 279. 
97 Plato Republic: 540b. 
98 Plato Republic: 520a. 
99 Plato Laws: 708d. 
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At this point I must warn that though there was a set of religious beliefs that grouped under 
the ‘Orphic’ brand, these beliefs were not homogenous. It has been suggested that because 
there is no collection of stories exclusive to the Orphic cult it cannot be regarded as a separate 
religion.100 Furthermore, the term ‘Orphic’, which has classical precedent, only designates a 
loose grouping of ideas which diverged from religious orthodoxy in a similar way to our 
contemporary ‘new age’.101 However, the existence of the philosophy which contemporaries 
referred to as ‘Orphic’ is testified by Plato’s own references to it in his dialogues and it is 
fragments of this religious assortment which is being considered here. 
We may therefore understand that it would be incorrect to label Socrates an ascetic, looking 
upon the material world with despair and wishing only to be released from the ‘prison’ of his 
body so that he may gain proximity to the realm of Forms. Supporting this, in Timaeus he 
says that unnatural and early death is “painful” for the soul.102 What Socrates’ Orphic 
references arguably reveal is not a lament of the soul’s imposed exile from the realm of the 
Forms, imprisoned in the body. Instead, Socrates’ dichotomy of the divine soul and chthonic 
body which comprise human nature illustrated through references to Orphic aetiology is a 
reaffirmation of dialogue and dialectic. Rather than seeking to escape humanity, Socrates 
seeks it out103 and it is telling that despite his plans to return to Athens at the beginning of 
Republic,104 he welcomes the opportunity to speak at Cephalus’ party.105  
We may argue then that Socrates’ understanding of soma-sema and the duality of soul and 
body is related to the Charioteer metaphor in Phaedrus,106 in which one horse is “tempered 
                                                            
100 Edmonds III 1999: 73. 
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102 Plato Timaeus: 81e. 
103 Plato Phaedrus: 230d. 
104 Plato Republic: 327c. 
105 Plato Republic: 329e. 
106 Plato Phaedrus: 255e. 
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by restraint and modesty”107 whilst the other is characterised by “wantonness and 
boastfulness”.108 As with the good charioteer who successfully manages to get his team 
cooperating, the balance of body and soul will produce the necessary equanimity required to 
effectively pursue self-improvement. Socrates beckons us towards towards dialectic, the sole 
path to understanding Goodness. If dialectic was entirely an intellectual endeavour, at the 
least excluding the body and at the most being inhibited by it, then why does Plato’s Socrates 
emphasize his place as being in the City? Why do all the dialogues available to us begin with 
a very physical description of movement and setting (the journey to the Piraeus in Republic, 
or the journey to the banks of the river Illisos in Phaedrus, the journey to the Lyceum “by the 
road outside the town wall”109 at the beginning of Lysis etc)? 
In answer, the dialogues may be understood to insist the material setting is as important as the 
dialectic. The soma – sema dichotomy has thus far been asserted to have influenced Socrates’ 
understanding of the realm of Forms.110 More pertinently to this section’s emphasis on 
hermeneutics, the Orphic significances of an arguably carefully chosen word by Socrates 
have also demonstrated the baggage a single word can bring to a text. ‘Soma’ has shown how 
a single word can colour and comment on the philosophy and ultimate meaning of a text and 
that the text as a whole functions within a pre-existing epistemology. But soma has also 
provided an example to lend gravity to the warning that the articulation of an idea can haul in 
its wake ideas possibly unintended by the speaker; after all, the Orphic link can only ever be 
an argument and cannot be stated unequivocally to be the intention of Plato or that of his 
Socrates. 
                                                            
107 Plato Phaedrus: 253d. 
108 Plato Phaedrus: 253e. 
109 Plato Lysis: 203a. 
110 Guthrie 1935: 157. 
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Concern with the communication of unintended meaning is discussed at by Desjardis in her 
reading of Phaedrus. She argues that Socrates’ concern that the only meaning which may be 
communicated is the subjective interpretation of the listener is what leads to his declaration 
against the written word.111 By citing Parmenides in her argument, Desjardis helps 
reemphasize the dialogues of Plato’s participation in the wider contemporary philosophical 
debate.112 By urging the reader to acknowledge the flexible relationship between meaning 
and language, Desjardis argues that Plato intentionally provokes the reader to question not 
only their interpretation of the written dialogue but also their understanding of the Socratic 
dialogue which the text records.113 The concern is with miscommunication or correct 
communication but with the result that the interlocutor does not understand why it is correct 
led the author of the seventh letter allegedly written by Plato to denounce Dionysius of 
Syracuse and his explanation of Plato’s philosophy.114 By publishing such a text, Dionysius 
was ignoring the central importance of dialectic to the philosophy he alleged to understand. 
What has been demonstrated, particularly in the discussion above of the wider Orphic 
significances of Socrates’ words, is the relevance of Gadamer’s call to take “what is said with 
an infinity of what is not said”.115 The “infinity of what is not said” may be understood as the 
dialectic within language which would further reinforce the importance of appreciating the 
dialogue’s dialectical emphasis. This is where the hermeneutics, which is the focus of this 
chapter, comes into play. As has been seen, the philosophy of Plato’s Socrates and our 
subsequent understanding of his text cannot be gleaned only from the script of his characters 
and will be further illustrated. The two modern texts which accompany and complement this 
consideration of Plato will emphasize the importance of discussion as reading the text. 
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114 Desjardis 1988: 116. 
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Student Number: 795827 
26 
 
Semantic Conflict in Utopia 
 
Language as a confluence of the author’s and audience’s understanding is revisited by the 
sudden end to Utopia in A Modern Utopia as well as in the arguments brought to bear by the 
John, the ‘Savage’, in Brave New World. In both these utopian visions it is the natural human 
variety of character that introduces doubt into the utopian State. This contamination may be 
introduced by the author in an effort to avoid the conclusion that the views expressed will be 
assigned as personal to them and so come to be identified as their doctrine.  
The failure of meaning in the chapter ‘The Bubble Bursts’ of A Modern Utopia can be seen 
where the Botanist’s frustration causes him to attack the Voice for constructing a Utopia 
which was firmly, exclusively his own.116 Similar protests are made by the Savage in his 
conversation with the World Controller in Brave New World about the hordes of human 
clones which perform the Services that allow the Utopian society to function.117 What takes 
place here is the final fall of the utopia on the introduction of a foreign personality who has 
the self-consciousness to interpret the Utopia independently.  The danger of placing one’s 
ideas within such an uncompromising setting as writing is raised and given expression in 
Phaedrus where Socrates argues against putting one’s thoughts in writing which is a 
“discourse which cannot defend itself” and brands it “a kind of shadow” of real 
understanding.118 He goes on to say that written discourse should only be used as “aids to 
recollection” to assist with the finer process of dialectic which is the most effective in gaining 
understanding of truth.119  
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This has hermeneutical implications, as well as implications for the understanding of the role 
of the utopian novel. Plato’s Socrates’ central concern is the need for objectivity – it was this 
idea which underpinned the system of education he laid out for his Guardian citizens.120 In 
setting out the best education for the pursuit of his Forms, Socrates concludes that certain 
kinds of poetry and painting (or as he calls it ‘representation’) nurture the more basic 
emotional drive which is “greedy for tears” and so “it’s incapable of listening to reason”.121 
The priority here is to safeguard the objectivity, allowing reason to thrive in daily decision 
making. Such a role is obstructed by the painters, the poets, the rhetoricians and sophists 
whose concern with entertainment and demagoguery temper language to this softer edge. 
Their use of language is deprived of the incisive dynamism which lets it cut through opinion 
and expose truth, instead seeking the audience’s investment in an idea which is morally 
ambivalent.  
That said, it would be wrong to believe that Plato’s Socrates saw no value at all in poetry or 
rhetoric. We only need look at the form of Socrates’ speeches or the Myth of Er at the end of 
Republic to see that the Socrates of the dialogues was not utterly ambivalent as to the value of 
either poetry or rhetoric to philosophy. Socrates understood poetry could work for - as well as 
against - philosophising, that poetry not only has the ability to make lies seem like truth but to 
also make truth seem like truth.122 Poetry’s obstruction, however, of Socrates’ dialectic seems 
to be epitomised by the use of poetic language in the lessons of the sophists which allege 
their own self-sufficiency and accuracy. After all, without such self-containment the sophist’s 
fees would have little justification. But meaning can never be self-sufficient since it requires 
the audience’s interpretation, which Socrates uncovers by exposing the dynamism of his 
interlocutor’s interpretive action. Offering a packaged truth in such a way disregards the 
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possibilities of misunderstanding and could leave the customer more ignorant than when they 
started. The characteristic which the Sophists ignore is that a word has plastic loyalties and so 
has no intrinsic preference to be the conveyor of either truth or belief. One may therefore 
propose that Socrates’ exile of the poets he judges to be detrimental to the morality of his 
citizens is an artificial attempt to tame language’s indiscriminate behaviour. This acts to 
break it in for service to truth since without the exile it would remain dangerously 
promiscuous, involving itself with fiction, belief and truth.  
Demonstrated above is the imperative that one must look not only in Republic for Socrates’ 
thoughts about the written word but also in the other dialogues because they are all a part of 
the same epistemology. This widening of the focus when looking at Plato’s hermeneutics 
must also be continued to take into account the work of the Presocratics. The contribution by 
Parmenides and other philosophers predating Plato meant that by the time he came to write 
his Socratic dialogues deductive techniques and the methodology of semantic analysis were 
in development.123 Furthermore, the argument of Plato’s Socrates that understanding 
existence lay in understanding the symbiotic relationship of the tangible and theoretic was 
itself not innovative because even in Plato’s day, such a technique would have been 
appreciated by many of his readers as distinctly Pythagorean.124 
This problem of interpretation defines the problems encountered in accommodating the 
individual which plague the modern utopian novels and also be seen in the degradation 
described by Socrates in Republic.125 In Truth and Method Gadamer articulates the central 
unsuitability of the written word: “What is true of every word in which thought is expressed, 
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is true also of the interpreting word, namely that it is not, as such, objective”.126 The point is 
further clarified when Gadamer writes “that all the meaning of what is handed down to us 
finds its concretion (i.e. is understood) in its relation to the understanding I – and not in 
reconstructing the originally intended I”.127 What he is saying is that the meaning of a text 
arises from within the reader or “understanding I” rather than the author. The identification of 
textual meaning with either the author or the reader made text unsuitable as a medium of 
communicating Platonic Socrates’ Realm of Forms, which relied heavily upon objectivity. 
On the other hand, dialectic produces a meaning which arises between the interlocutors, a 
“spark of understanding” when the beliefs of the interlocutors are rubbed together.128 
Derrida takes a more rigorous approach to Socrates’ treatment of meaning. In his 
Dissemination he looks at the treatment of the art of writing (referred to by Socrates as 
‘pharmakon’) in the dialogues and forms the conclusion that Socrates regarded it as having 
“no real identity”, that it was in fact “aneidetic” (derived from the Ancient Greek an meaning 
“without” and eidos “form”).129 He moves onto the notorious treatment of the painters in the 
Couch Analogy of the Republic, arguing that the choice of referring to the paintings of these 
artists as ‘pharmaka’ is significant.  Highlighting the similar cosmetic regard for both 
painting and writing (even equating the two) Derrida argues that Socrates sees them both as 
“a cosmetic concealing the dead under the appearance of the living”.130 Such implicit 
warnings in the dialogues against placing too much store by any single declaration of ‘truth’ 
demonstrates Plato’s awareness that a text, with its finite and monologic discussion, may be 
skewed by its interpretation.131  
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Dialectic was therefore arguably conceived to help overcome a possibly misleading ending of 
a philosophical dialogue, be it written or oral. It was then hoped that the resulting dance of 
logoi would produce an understanding which was independent of the imperfect and 
complacent beliefs of either interlocutor like a spark from the friction of two sticks.132 
Complacency in ones beliefs or logos is repeatedly shown to be anti-philosophical when an 
interlocutor voices an accepted truth which they overheard but are then unable to defend 
when pressed.133 To illustrate this point, Plato’s Socrates in Charmides demonstrates that one 
of the protagonists, after putting forward an explanation which he heard from another, is 
shown not to understand the meaning of it.134 In these situations we are shown the crucial 
function of dialectic to goad us on and prevent such an anti-philosophical complacency 
unwittingly based on falsehood.  
The implications this has for the understanding of the textual utopian vision are that the 
vision contained within it is not to be regarded as the final stage but as – in the words of 
Phaedrus’ Socrates – “track aids”135 to a greater understanding of the Ideal, positions from 
which to begin one’s own investigation into the best of all possible states. One may therefore 
see that the very form of the Platonic dialogue, in its debate between two characters over the 
suitability of an ideal, forms one of the fundamental mediums by which the modern utopian 
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Dilution of Meaning 
 
Derrida further illuminates the dialectics of Plato’s dialogues in his dissection of the myth of 
Egyptian gods Theuth and Thamus recorded in Plato’s Phaedrus.136 Derrida explores this 
myth in the context of the problematically tenuous connection between the author’s intentions 
in using a word and its interpretation by those listening. Derrida identifies one of the roots of 
this problem of interpretation as lying in the nature of the written word as a third-order 
signifier. The ‘original understanding’ begins in the mind of the individual (first order) which 
they then communicate verbally to another (second order) who in turn records the verbal 
communication using signs written in ink (third order). By this point the grip of the ‘original 
meaning’ has become significantly weakened since these “signs of voice” are themselves 
only signifiers of another level - ‘signs of thought’.137 The division of understanding into 
different orders of signifiers helps articulate the danger of misunderstanding. Awareness of 
the extent to which writing muddied the waters of the author’s meaning is the concern behind 
Socrates’ denouncement of text to defend and so clarify meaning.138 
By distilling communication into an order of signifiers, Derrida ultimately concludes that 
writing is only concerned with “resemblance itself”.139 The implication of this statement is 
that no form of writing can contain the author’s original Logos. Now, we may find it easier to 
understand the attention Socrates devotes to the mimesis of the artists looked at above. They 
only produce a semblance of reality rather than reality itself and this is of no use to the 
philosopher. In this way, Derrida demonstrates the extent of, and reasoning behind, Socrates’ 
mitigation of arriving at any final lesson in the dialogues. 
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With Derrida’s analysis explained, it is now possible to recognise Socrates’ belief in the 
impotence of the instructive word. In Plato’s Lysis, Socrates prefers to demonstrate the kind 
of conversation Hippothales should produce to ensnare the object of his affections - who 
bears the name of the dialogue - rather than dictate precisely how it is to be done.140 A little 
earlier in the dialogue, when Socrates asks for a sample of the kind of odes which 
Hippothales has been composing for Lysis, Hippothales declines but instead insists that one 
of his friends reproduce it for Socrates.141 Again, the dialogues are emphasizing text’s 
unsuitability for instruction (after all we should remember that though the dialogues are 
records of verbal conversations they are first and foremost written texts) because of the 
deathly hue of its meaning. Writing, Derrida argues, only “repeats repetition”142 but this “is 
not the repetition of the living”143 but the “repetition of death”144 and concludes “then bam! 
They are good for nothing. They are mere figurines, masks, simulcra”.145 What Derrida is 
arguing and which is also supported by the consistent absence of the author throughout the 
dialogues as well as the extreme removal of the author seen in Lysis above, is that any order 
of signifier dilutes the original Logos as it moves beyond the person who conceived it. This 
implies a troubling conclusion that no Logos may be faithfully communicated.  
What, then, can the dialogues written by Plato communicate to us? What is their value if all 
its text can communicate is “repetition of death”146 devoid of vitality? After all, many of the 
dialogues including Republic, Lysis, Protagoras and Phaedrus are all explicit and self-
acknowledged recollections of Socrates’ conversations which further emphasize their 
removal from the context of the original dialogue  (not only are we reading it thousands of 
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years after it took place but we are relying on the verbal recollection of an additional fictional 
character). It is to the scenes in Lysis cited above to which we must return.  
When Socrates decides instead to demonstrate a conversation rather than describe in didactic 
monologue the Logos of erotic conversation the resulting lesson is one Hippothales must 
make his own, contemplating Socrates’ demonstration. More generally, it is the dialectic of 
the dialogues which must ultimately be taken away from our reading. The concealment of the 
author and the dilution of the text’s meaning, undermined and fraught with uncertainty is 
therefore a legitimate function of the dialogue. Such forced involvement of the reader’s own 
interpretive action resuscitates the dialogue after the last ghoulish printed word has been read. 
Wells himself underwent a trial by fire when he disregarded the premature finality of the 
written word. Anticipations (1901), which preceded his utopian novels, was heavily criticised 
for the lack of compassion in the scientific society he foresaw and advocated, and particularly 
in the program of eugenics which was to carve humanity into its optimal form. This may be 
seen in the responses of two prominent friends of Wells: Joseph Conrad and Winston 
Churchill. In a personal letter to Wells, Joseph Conrad asks why his Utopia must be so 
exclusive and why everyone may not be “welcome, appreciated and made use of”.147 Conrad 
goes on to point out that the exclusivity and “clique-ism”148 could harm the case and actually 
lead to a “fatal limiting of influence”.149  
Churchill, in one of his own personal letters to Wells, pointed out that the specialised 
knowledge in which Wells placed so much faith was by its nature limited and so the 
“unlimited ignorance of the plain man who knows where it hurts is a safer guide than any 
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vigorous direction of a specialised character”.150 It was further reviewed in the Bookman in 
December of 1901, denounced as “vulgar” and the reviewer stated that “it irritates, it 
exasperates, it offends”.151 The reviewer goes on to conclude “We content ourselves with 
saying that this new man of Mr Wells’ imagination appears to us nothing more than a 
machine, with steel springs for a heart”.152 The desire to redress and explain more fully the 
reasoning behind the conclusions in Anticipations was what led him to begin writing A 
Modern Utopia.153  
Significantly, any extensive and detailed foray into Wells’ utopianism and his beliefs in how 
it should be built and maintained would from now on be in the form of the conversational 
novel, closely and self-consciously miming the Platonic dialogues. Such reluctance to lecture, 
preferring to demonstrate (a form, incidentally, which would be more difficult to label 
canonical since it self-consciously is not a blanket ruling but an example tailored to current 
situation) is articulated in no uncertain terms in the scene in Plato’s Lysis cited above.154  
When asked to demonstrate the kind of conversation which will best capture Hippothales’ 
love, Socrates says “That is not an easy thing to tell” preferring instead to “show” him “an 
example of the conversation you should hold with him”.155 This is axiomatic of the chosen 
format with which he constructs all of his dialogues. A pronouncement on the way this 
conversation should be conducted – or on the best way to explore any of the subjects of 
Plato’s other dialogues – would have been more likely to stunt the dialectic rather than 
nurture it. As will be seen below, this reluctance to state the definitive rule for the subject in 
hand, which in this case is the ideal State, is what allows Wells to form his belief in the 
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‘dynamic utopia’.156 Emphasis on dynamism accommodates the possibility of later dialogue 
between readers in how best to set up the World State whose concept Wells is dedicated to 
but whose precise form is left open to interpretation.  
Levels of Meaning in Wells’ Utopian Text 
 
The focus will now be brought to bear directly on the dialogues within Wells’ ‘conversational 
novels’ and to what degree Wells’ dialogue emulates the success of its Platonic archetype. 
Wells looks at the nature of the truly ‘conversational novel’157 in Boon, The Mind of the Race, 
The Wild Asses of the Devil, and the Last Trump (from this point on to be referred to simply 
as ‘Boon’) in 1915.158 In this novel concerns with the Form appear. We see in Boon the 
flexibility of the conversational form in allowing different approaches to be brought in (seen 
in constant reference to approaches by different authors and reference by one of the 
characters to the Encyclopaedia being personified so that it may explain and defend itself).159 
This leads to another debt of Wells’ to Plato since Plato provides precedent by appropriating 
a variety of approaches for his dialogue. 
One example of appropriation is the elenchus (rigorous cross-examination) Socrates placed at 
the centre of his philosophy’s methodology.160 Once elenchus was introduced, he adapted it 
to his own philosophical ends. Socrates did not use elenchus like Gorgias (to simply win the 
game at hand)161 but instead to have his interlocutor recognise a vacuum of true knowledge 
and how best to obtain the truth. The dialogue of Meno affords an opportunity for Plato’s 
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Socrates to broaden the methodological armoury of his philosophy by appropriating the 
scientific rigour of mathematics to clarify his principle of Recollection.162  
This demonstrates that there is no single way to practise philosophy. As long as there are at 
least two people in conversation then any techne (‘art’) may be used for philosophy. 
Returning to Wells, the section of A Modern Utopia where the Voice meets his double (who 
is a member of the ruling caste of Utopia known as the ‘Samurai’), Wells makes a similar 
attempt to acquire the same rigorous, scientific reasoning to prove the virtue of the World 
State’s institutions. To help understand this more fully, reference must be made to the scene 
in Plato’s Ion referred to in the opening passage of this chapter. In the passage I explained 
Socrates’ argument that the rhapsode’s judgement of poetry is of little worth since he cannot 
know if the poet he is reciting speaks truly about the techniques the poet describes, such as 
chariot racing.163 In the scene from A Modern Utopia cited above we are provided with a 
modern analogue of this baseless presumption by the rhapsode in Wells’ praise of Plato’s 
Guardian caste. One might respond that, unlike Ion who recites scenes conceived by Homer, 
A Modern Utopia is Wells’ unique and novel envisioning of utopia. This would mean that 
earlier utopias become irrelevant and so the credibility of Wells’ own novel vision is 
maintained. But this is not true; Lewis Mumford hailed A Modern Utopia as the 
“quintessential utopia” since it “sums up and clarifies the Utopias of the past”164 - it looks at 
issues “which all the other utopias have raised”.165 This demonstrates that it would be a 
mistake to believe Wells’ utopia to be a unique addition to the utopian tradition when in it is a 
continuation of that tradition. Wells is reciting past utopias as Ion recites the poems of 
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Homer, only Wells gives it a personalised cosmetic - his ‘Samurai’ which are intended to be 
Plato’s Guardians in all but name.  
Bearing this observation in mind and the explicit statement of inspiration by the Guardians of 
Plato’s Republic,166 Wells is caught in the same trap as Ion; Wells recites the idea of the 
Guardian as laid out by Socrates in Republic without truly understanding the philosophy 
which constructed this governing class and so departs from the role the Guardians are 
intended to undertake in the dialogues. As with Ion’s understanding of Homer’s poetry, Wells 
asserts the virtue, suitability and pre-eminence of the Guardian caste of Plato’s Republic 
without remaining faithful to their vision. Where his understanding stumbles is in the 
dogmatic, even religious fervour he describes this caste as possessing.167 To his credit, Wells 
seems to recognise this dogmatism and so tries to describe the evolutionary existence it has 
undergone. This falls a little flat when he describes how “every year it becomes a little better 
adapted... We have now a whole literature, with many very fine things in it, written about the 
Rule”.168 What must be highlighted is that the Rule is “adapted” and has many fine things 
written “about” it. It seems that this deliberative process is only superficial since it is adapted 
and talked about but there is no hint that its fundamental presumptions are ever questioned. 
As has been emphasized from the beginning, the sole aim of Socrates’ dialectic is to oppose 
and attack the unquestioning and thoughtless obedience which Wells describes in his 
Samurai. The acquiescence and explanations of the institutions with nothing like the same 
meticulous detail and natural feel which is so characteristic of the conversations between 
Socrates and his interlocutors ultimately brands this a failure and a superficial attempt at the 
reproduction of Socratic dialectic.  It exemplifies what has been argued to be a common 
tendency of modern attempts to reproduce the natural conversational tones of the Platonic 
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dialogues. It all too often descends into a dynamic of the teacher and the student.169 This 
dynamic lends the conversation a methodical feel which reduces its organic basis and gives it 
a didactic tone, so stunting the sought after dialectic.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that it can be difficult to interpret a text which is part of a 
tradition as varied and extensive as that of the utopian text independent of reference to that 
tradition. We have consistently been shown that the texts looked at in this chapter at least 
exist within a literary tradition which influences and is influenced by the text and the 
interpretive actions of its reader. The emphasis of Gadamer on approaching a text in light of 
its wider tradition has proven to be pertinent again and again. The texts penned by Plato have 
also been seen to partially rely on the pre-existing tradition of semantic analysis exemplified 
by Heraclitus and Gorgias. Possible misinterpretation by the author of such a pre-existing 
tradition must also be a consideration in the reader’s interpretation, seen most clearly in the 
passage cited from Ion and to a lesser certain extent in the appropriation by Wells’ World 
State of Plato’s Guardians.  
Wells’ Samurai reveal how a concept may be robbed of its originally intended meaning but 
still continue to exist. This is also seen in post-Platonic attempts to reproduce the dialectic 
and rigorous cross-examination (‘elenchus’) which Plato’s Socrates made his own. Both of 
these philosophic methods seek the most accurate definition of their subject which is why 
Socrates devotes such extensive time to issues of meaning. To anachronistically borrow one 
of Wells’ terms, the resulting understanding of the nature of meaning lends deeper and 
increased significance to our understanding of the ‘dynamic Utopia’. The arguments 
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deployed by Gadamer, which also appeared in the dialogues of Plato, have demonstrated the 
pitfalls and difficulties in communicating a Utopia whilst still preserving it as one’s own 
‘Good Place’. The above demonstrates that the choice of vocabulary in explaining utopian 
institutions are as central to the final understanding of the utopian state as the institutions 
themselves.  
We also saw that, in hiding the location of the ultimate authority within a text, the author is 
able to preserve the natural feel of the action and so prevent it seeming didactic. As well as 
maintaining the genuine dialogue, this removal of obvious authority helps draw in and 
involve the reader in the utopian project through the resulting imperative of interpretation and 
so expands the dialogue beyond the confines of the text. By this small act of reader-
recruitment, the utopian dialogue accomplishes the most basic objective of any utopian 
project: provoking a wider dialogue looking at how to improve the current circumstances. 
The dialogue creates a debate within the novel and, through its ambiguities, outside of the 
novel, opening a forum through which the author may present his vision and instigate the 
continuation of the dialogue. This chapter has sought to show how the significances of 
meaning to the individual which arise in any reading or interpretation of a text make the 
reader as much of a consideration in the understanding of a text as the author. What this 
chapter has shown is that the form of the dialogue and the language used defines Socrates’ 
philosophy equally if not more so, than the conversations themselves. 
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3. The Author’s Bodyguard 
 
The focus of the last chapter was the nature of meaning and the how this affects the 
significances of the given text. This was identified as one of a number of ways a text might 
be judged other than by its narrative. As well as the hermeneutics of the text, this chapter will 
introduce the idea that the personality of the character can similarly provide a commentary on 
the philosophy contained in a text.  This subtext will be shown to enrich not only the novel 
itself but the cosmos of Socrates’ philosophy as it is represented in the dialogues of Plato and 
further expand the definition of the ‘Platonic’. 
One of Wells’ most self-conscious experiments with the potential use of character was in 
Boon and the influence of the Platonic dialogues on the literary form in which he presents this 
story can be seen from the very first paragraph of the book’s introduction. Here Wells writes 
as himself, telling the reader about the eulogy which he has supposedly received from a 
writer (who is a fictional character) about an author (who is, again, fictional) who recently 
passed away. The introduction has a light-hearted tone in which Wells talks of his 
“inseparable intimacy” with the author and the first-hand knowledge of its contents without 
having even read the book.170 However, he also describes the book as “indiscreet”, “ill-
advised” and voices a “strong suspicion that this Introduction is designed to entangle me in 
the responsibility of this [the fictional author’s which was sent along with the eulogy] 
book”.171 This layering of the scene with fiction over nonfiction so closely that the reader is 
confused to which the story actually belongs is significant. This form is ideal for what Wells 
and Socrates (and perhaps Plato) intend their texts to do – bringing the fiction close enough to 
reality to make it a serious consideration and so unbalance the reader. The reader is 
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challenged to consider the place of the text and its message in their reality. Davis explains 
aptly “we need fiction to see reality afresh”.172 This effort to distance from the reader and 
assume the mask of a fictional character gives an author the intellectual freedom to articulate 
ideas which might otherwise have been dismissed as distasteful or nonsense. The public 
backlash at the coldly scientific view of society in his Anticipations of the Reaction of 
Mechanical and Scientific Progress upon Human Life and Thought (1901) described in the 
previous chapter would have given Wells first-hand experience of the danger of thrusting 
new-born ideas straight into the light without first packaging and experimenting with them in 
the literary laboratory of utopian fiction. As will be seen, looking at these ideas from behind a 
fictional failsafe means that these ideas can be voiced with relative freedom may also be 
explored in greater detail. When Davis writes the words quoted above he is talking about the 
seminal utopian text Utopia by Thomas More.173 In his text Thomas More uses the fictional 
character of Hythloday to mount a scathing attack on the justice of sixteenth century English 
society174. Similar removed criticism features in virtually all of Plato’s dialogues, most 
obviously in Republic and the section of the dialogue between Socrates and Thrasymachus in 
which the former criticises the oligarchic opinion of justice and right government.175 Plato 
utilised feature of the dialogues so effectively that the debate about which are his sincere 
thoughts and which are inserted for the sake of drama is still on-going.176  
Returning to the use of character in Boon, the eponymous character sets out his intentions for 
the form of the prospective novel and declares that they will need a character that will 
“embody our Idea”.177 This may be used to illuminate Plato’s thoughts when choosing 
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Socrates as a protagonist or else why choose such a significant character as Socrates to be the 
leading voice in most of the dialogues? Plato’s dramatic use of Socrates as a two dimensional 
idea is also replicated in the Voice and the Botanist of A Modern Utopia whose only roles are 
to represent the scientific and romantic personalities with which any Utopia must contend. 
This is evident not only in what they say but also in their characteristics.  
Alternatively, the use of the dialogic medium for a utopian vision, rather than being a defence 
of one’s views against external criticism, may instead be understood as an internal dialogue 
which seeks resolution of the author’s psychological tensions. Beginning with Wells  A 
Modern Utopia, this dialogue is represented most prominently in the two characters of the 
Botanist and the Voice. It has been argued that for Wells, the Botanist may have represented 
all the “possessive jealousies and amorous fixations”178 the contemporary world must 
transcend in order to approach Utopia and that Wells recognised this to be a personal as well 
as a collective challenge.179  
The Voice and the Botanist have been regarded as Wells’ own scientific and romantic 
inclinations in tense conflict which revolved around the discrepancy between what he knew 
Utopia to be and whether it was a place in which he would wish to live and whether it could 
even accept him in the first place.180 A similar concern with the reconciliation of two 
opposing human natures (the chthonic versus divine) launches Socrates into state-building in 
Republic in which the offered solution sets its store by Guardian class.181 This is seen in the 
dual function of a Guardian as a philosopher as well as a “well-bred hound” that will defend 
the community ferociously against any external threat.182 The tension between such esoteric 
intellectualism on the one hand and the visceral nature of warfare on the other, along with the 
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tripartite psychology183 and degeneration of the ideal community,184 illustrate Socrates’ 
recognition that these opposing human natures are inseparable and in conflict.  
The tension between aspiration and the realities of human nature confronting and obstructing 
those aspirations has been observed in Plato’s Parmenides. Parmenides has been argued to 
afford the reader a rare proximity to the author for where we can witness remarkable self-
criticism of the doctrine of Forms. The interpretation of the philosophy of the dialogue is that 
Plato – through his character of Socrates – is confronting the legitimate arguments which may 
be brought to bear on his doctrine of Ideas.185 The ideological conflict taking place in this 
dialogue is between Socrates’ wish to uphold his theory of the doctrine of Ideas and the belief 
in universalistic knowledge and to hold true to the pursuit of truth at any price.186 Whether 
the decision to split the philosophical process between two individuals to form a dialogue is 
to bring peace of mind to a psychological tension (as with the Wellsian characters) or 
whether it is to dramatically scrutinise one’s own doctrine in light of conceivable critique, we 
nevertheless arrive at the same conclusion. The decision to divide one’s text into a bi-polar 
discussion, a dialogue, is not trivial but can play an important role in comprehensively 
understanding the text. 
The purification of the ideal around which the text is built has also been identified as an 
effect of the deployment of the dialogue format. This purification takes place in the repeated 
division of the definitions of the ideal which helps reduce it to its most basic and indisputable 
form.187 An clear example of such process of purification can be found in Plato’s Statesman 
in which the art (‘techne’) of the Statesman is subdivided into to its constituent properties of a 
‘physical’ art and an ‘intellectual’ one which in turn is divided into the properties of the 
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ability to judge and the ability to command and the process of division continues until the 
exact nature of the art of the Statesman is uncovered. This semantic investigation of one word 
which leads to another equally unsatisfactory word is evocative of the imagery in one of 
Plato’s most famous metaphors, that of the Cave. When the newly released prisoner emerges 
into the daylight Socrates describes how he is unable to look directly at the Sun but instead 
can only examine its reflection in a nearby pool of water.188 This metaphore aptly illustrates 
the nature of meaning in the Platonic dialogues; that each word has the reflection of another 
within it. The duality of perspective and character is thus shown to help clarify and define the 
utopia. This has the effect of purifying the idea so that it may be understood and followed by 
another. Such apparently endless movement with no clear statement as to how or when the 
logos might be uncovered also hints at the open-ended confusion in which many of the 
characters of the dialogues are described at the dialogues’ end. We will return to this final 
point to later in the chapter though, for now the focus will be drawn back to the use of 
character in the utopian literature under scrutiny. 
It is significant to note that Socrates is not always placed in the senior position as leader of 
the dialectic in the dialogues and is presented as the student in some cases, such as in the 
dialogue Parmenides where the eponymous sophist is the one educating a Young Socrates. 
This is not so in Wells’ novels where the protagonist (who is often described with an 
appearance and attitude evocative of Wells himself) frequently occupies a notional role as the 
student learning about the utopian system from one of its residents or statesmen. This 
apparently subordinate role is deceptive, since Wells’ avatar does not receive his lessons with 
a critical mind but instead finds himself agreeing with the sense and order which the utopian 
describes. Since there does not seem to be any serious attempt to sympathise with the 
opposing arguments, the reader is left with an artificial impression of consensus regarding the 
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virtue of the system advocated. When characters representing alternative schools of thought 
of the ideal existence are presented, they are ridiculed and dismissed for their naivety and 
ignorance; the Romantic from the chapter entitled the ‘Voice of Nature’ in A Modern Utopia 
provides a pertinent example.  
The treatment of the ‘Voice of Nature’ by the earthling Voice may be argued to be filled with 
irony and hypocrisy when one remembers that it is such intolerance of different points of 
view which will eject the Voice and Botanist from the Voice’s utopia in the end. Upon 
initially coming across this romantic Voice of Nature (to be hereon in referred to as the 
‘Romantic’ to avoid confusion with the protagonist The Voice) The Voice complains that the 
Romantic is not interested in the earthlings but instead runs roughshod over their 
introductions with his own selfish thoughts.189 Later on he further complains that it was 
obvious that the Romantic “had an inordinate impulse to lecture”190 and finally, when the 
Romantic asks whether he was listening “’No,’ I said bluntly”.191 Once the utopian bubble 
has burst the Botanist accuses the Voice of seeming “harsh and dogmatic”192 and not 
allowing for his – the Botanist’s - position.193  
This is in stark contrast with the arguments put forward by Gadamer and Derrida described at 
the beginning of this dissertation which point to the extraordinary lengths to which Plato 
seems to have gone to prevent any interpretation of his texts as dogmatic and canonical. 
Instead, Plato seems to have his character of Socrates undermine his own teachings through 
his tentativeness, uncertainty and withdrawal of arguments.194 A stark example of this can be 
found in Phaedrus where, after making a speech heralded as a more effective argument for 
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the conclusion of Lysias’ speech, Socrates then withdraws it for fear and shame of impiety to 
eros (the Love deity).195 Though this interpretation may be offset by the fact that he replaces 
it with a speech he judges more pious and “sound doctrine”196 the argument remains that by 
declaring his initial conclusion flawed, Socrates has bought into question all his argument. If 
the first is wrong how is the reader to know that he did not walk away from this dialogue – a 
self-proclaimed simpleton197 - and decide that this second conclusion was wrong too? 
Elsewhere, At the end of Lysis the reader finds Socrates self-deprecating for his having made 
himself “ridiculous (katagelastoi)”.198 Similarly, in Ion he calls himself a “simple layman 
(idioten anthropon)”.199 To further strengthen this point, Socrates’ confusing self-doubt also 
appears in Meno in which Socrates and his interlocutor come to an apparent conclusion only 
for Socrates to question its truth on what would seem to be the most pedantic to the point of 
eristic reason. 200 This all works to maintain the ‘Socratic Irony’201 which enables Plato’s 
Socrates to keep enough of a distance from argument to judge it objectively and to keep the 
dialectic as open and natural as possible. This irony removes the reverence for the traditions 
passed down which result in our embracing of these traditions unquestioningly. This 
illustrates the ability to simultaneously revere and scrutinise to the point of criticism one’s 
own traditions.202 The use of characters in a utopian hypothesis can provide further 
contribution s to the text. In both A Modern Utopia and the Platonic dialogues the presence of 
characters other than the protagonist may be argued to play a similar role to that of the Greek 
Chorus in the tragedies, where they provide the voice of social convention, the reaction of the 
audience and a means through which the division  between the audience and the dramatic 
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events are blurred.203 Venturing into the field which looks at Greek drama and tragedy would 
require more resources than are available for this exploration. For the time being we must be 
content with ideas gleaned from its borders. The emphasis throughout this thesis is that the 
boundaries of meaning are porous and plastic, these samples will hint at the multiple 
perspectives from which the dialogues may be considered and how their meaning would be 
hard, if not impossible, to enclose with the rigid finality of a single text. It is left to the reader 
to decide whether to pursue further. 
There is anecdotal evidence that draws together Socrates and tragedy; that it was the 
tragedian Euripides who lent Socrates a copy of Heraclitus’ philosophical text and asked for 
his opinion on the ideas it recorded.204 Additionally, a more technical illustration is in the 
tension between emotional and rational imperatives205 in many of Euripides’ plays which are 
evocative of the charioteer analogy in Phaedrus.206 The most relevant dramatic device for 
broadening our understanding of the dialogues in the context of uses of character in 
Euripides’ tragedies is the relationship between the protagonist and the chorus.  
Goldhill argues that agon (‘contest’) which takes place between the protagonist and chorus 
helps the audience form a social identity.207 In this guise the Chorus helps present the very 
specific narrative within a wider system of tradition and social values.208 As we see in 
Phaedrus and Republic, Plato’s Socrates’ ideal society is one where citizens identify 
themselves with the quest for the good209 and the fear of this quest being inhibited forces 
Socrates to admit that no philosopher will risk participation in any society which does not 
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hold such values.210 Understanding the specific circumstances of the dialogues within the 
wider ‘Platonic’ and philosophic tradition as it existed was emphasized in the preceding two 
chapters. Indeed, the spheres within which Socrates wishes his philosophy to function may be 
thought of as concentric. Each dialogue can be understood as being created to interact with 
and against the other dialogues (such inter-textual hostility can be seen between Republic and 
Protagoras where the latter criticises the doctrine of Forms laid out in the former), this being 
the initial sphere. The second sphere, as was seen in Gadamer and Derrida’s readings, is the 
interaction of the dialogues as a whole within the sphere of traditions of the reader. It is 
conceivable, and in some places supported, that Plato would have looked to dramatic 
examples in order to understand and emulate their ability to function within a wider 
environment than the one they immediately describe. 
 In Gorgias Socrates explains that harmony is not the ultimate objective but, where needed, 
his philosophy is aiming to raise conflict when good is not the priority and “striving with it as 
hard as we can”.211 As we see with the frustration of Thrasymachus in Republic212 and the 
indignation of Polus in Gorgias,213 Socrates had the reputation of raising contentious 
arguments and leaving them unanswered. This too has Euripidean precedent such as in 
Heraklidae where Euripides presents one judgement of Eurystheus as the villain of the piece 
but then undermines this by making the audience extend their sympathy towards him on his 
death bed.214 By provoking such a pronounced reaction from the audience, the dialectic 
between the protagonist and chorus blurred the division between drama and reality, placing 
the audience within the action.215 If not precedents, then scenes such as these clearly 
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demonstrate Plato’s dialogues functioning within a wider cultural context and so emphasizing 
the dialogues as a fragment of a whole. Bearing this function in mind we might understand 
why Plato would choose to look at the tragic plays when he decided to write his dialogues 
since the corner stone of the philosophy advocated by Plato’s Socrates is the active 
participation (and to some extent, leadership) and subversion of the audience’s 
expectations.216  
Unfortunately a more detailed and technical consideration of what influence dramatic writers 
such as Euripides had on the creation of the dialogues and their philosophy must be left to 
others. What this brief foray has demonstrated and emphasized is that Plato appreciated the 
virtues of the techniques of the artist and playwright despite the unfavourable treatment he 
has his characters give them in many of the dialogues. Additionally, the dramatic use of 
character in Plato’s dialogues, arguably partially inspired by the use of the Chorus by 
tragedians such as Euripides, provides for Plato a means by which to convey the philosophy 
other than through the speech of Socrates.. We have thus seen here the depth of the dialogic 
medium which makes it so appropriate a platform for philosophy as intricate and complex as 
Socrates’ answer to of to what is the best way to live. 
 Despite Wells attempts to emulate the philosophic rigour of the Platonic dialogues and the 
vitality of the characters that populate them,217 he nevertheless fails to reproduce the spirit of 
the rhetoric. Instead of using the opportunity afforded the format by Plato to scrutinise 
objectively, Wells only offers a veneer of dialectic rigour. This is seen most clearly in his 
choice, as author of the Utopia, to place his own double in the ruling caste of Samurai who 
govern and immerse themselves in the ideology of Utopia.218 By identifying himself so 
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closely with the most central machinations of government in his Utopia he introduces a 
glaring conflict of interest. This removes any possibility of objectively stepping outside of the 
Utopia in order to assess its worth, as Socrates managed to do through his ironic approach.219  
Huxley too affords us an opportunity to observe an attempt to similarly use characters 
manifesting different ideas to refine and reinforce the virtue of an argument. However, unlike 
Plato but like Wells, this acts to weaken the philosophy of the text by robbing it of its vitality; 
the dialogue ceases to seem natural but rather take the form of a careful manipulation of the 
reader into sympathy with the author. Huxley’s rigid grip on the tiller of Brave New World is 
felt in the extreme polarities which arise in his World State.220 The author’s agenda is clear in 
the blissful ignorance, where anything unpleasant is simply ignored, or escaped through the 
hallucinogenic soma, or where the world is tolerated with an attitude of Christian stoicism, 
where happiness comes from the nobility of a spirit tempered by adversity. At the hospital the 
insensitivity of the Utopians around the bed of the Savage’s dead mother (“Like maggots they 
had swarmed defilingly over the mystery of Linda’s death”)221 is another such example as 
well as the dialogue between the Savage and the Controller.222 In both these instances it is 
made clear which belief the author wishes the reader to sympathise with. Through such an 
action the utopian vision is robbed of its objectivity and natural feel and brings it closer to a 
dogmatic preach rather than a philosophic effort to understand a problem. One may even read 
the use of the character of the Savage in a particular scene by Huxley as a covert tactic to 
enlist the sympathy and support of the reader even if a reader consciously seeks a neutral 
reading. Adorno argues that, despite the official policy of Huxley’s utopia to desensitise its 
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citizens against sexual morality, in the scene when Lenina attempts to seduce the Savage223  
(who here represents traditional Christian morality), the description of the scene as she 
undresses is still erotic.224 What Adorno does not note is that the erotic overtones of this 
scene can only be understood as such by interacting with the reader’s own sensibilities. By 
provoking such a reaction in the reader, Huxley further erodes the ability of the reader to 
assess, form their own conclusion and so engage in a true dialectic. Instead the reader is 
enlisted into Huxley’s disapproval of the scene at least, if not the entire Utopia. In such 
scenes as well as the finality of the ending to the book in which the Savage commits suicide 
in despair at the society that has entrapped him, the text adopts Gorgiatic rhetoric which seeks 
only to convince the audience of a final opinion rather than prolong the philosophic action. 
What we see above is robbery of the natural feel of Huxley’s utopian dialogue and vision. 
The Savage’s own extreme (in the sense of intensity and self-imposed alienation) revulsion at 
this vision of ‘civilisation’ renders this vision static and so beyond recall. Its rigidity is 
illustrated physically in the Savage’s choice to retreat into isolation towards the end of the 
book.225 Socrates’ calls for the continuation of dialectic after the end of the written dialogue 
as well as his belief in the fluidity of meaning and how it may change from one moment to 
the next,226 reveals an opposing belief that human understanding is not so rigid and is not 
served by retreating from dialectical scrutiny (‘agon’). The prologues of many of the 
dialogues show Socrates welcoming the chance to analyse another’s perspective and have his 
own similarly analysed, as he says in Phaedrus it is the “people in the city have something to 
teach me”.227 What is seen in the dialogues - as opposed to the novels of either Wells or 
Huxley - is that the characters demonstrate the dynamism of utopian philosophy and the only 
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way by which some utopian understanding may be reached. A more general conclusion to 
what we have seen here is that the personalities and silent actions (withdrawal and isolation) 
of the characters can, in themselves, function as a vehicle for the author’s philosophy. 
One might argue that by providing two personas of the same character in different contexts 
(one foreign and from earth the other Utopian and immersed in its processes) Wells was 
trying to provide another route to criticism by providing a dichotomy with which to assess 
which character would be most desirable. This would be true if the earthly persona did not 
come to endorse and empathise so strongly with the arguments of the Samurai twin for the 
virtue of Utopia. This lack of sincere criticism represents the greatest betrayal of A Modern 
Utopia’s Platonic (or ‘Socratic’) pretensions. Instead, Wells can be accused of committing a 
crime Plato’s Socrates associates with the Sophists and which he articulates in Gorgias as a 
trait of Rhetoric, namely that it “is a producer of persuasion for belief, not for instruction in 
the matter of Right or Wrong”.228 This means that the dialogic premise of the ‘conversational 
novel’, in the end, resembles more the diatribe than dialogue.229 The term for this rigorous 
cross-examination which the characters in Wells’ A Modern Utopia attempt but ultimately 
fails to reproduce is ‘elenchus’.  
The conclusion which may be drawn from the above is that despite Wells’ attempted 
emulation of the elenchus and dialogue of Plato’s texts, they can never truly be a 
reproduction of the reasoned argument they contained since for Socrates they rest on the 
guarantee that the argument is open and blind. The ad hoc and natural progression of the 
conversation in the dialogues is seen in several places such as Cratylus230or in a more jarring 
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turnaround in Phaedrus231 where Socrates is made to reconsider his position after critical 
introspection or a sudden insight into the problem. The lack of agenda or dogma help 
reinforce his assertion that rather than a teacher he is a facilitator, not imparting any truths 
but seeking simply to bequeath the tools for us to arrive at our own wisdom.232 This is in 
contrast to the didactic tone struck by Wells’ Utopians when they explain their system of 
government.233 Socrates’ most clear renouncement of wisdom comes in Theaetetus where 
Socrates declares that he does not contain within him any wisdom but only seeks to help 
bring it forth from others in the same way as midwives help expectant mothers to deliver.234  
We saw above the way Voice of Wells’ utopian text and Villa’s understanding of Socratic 
Irony help convey the lengths to which Socrates went to preserve the organic feel of his 
dialogues. But we can also argue that he is not completely successful in this regard and point 
to instances where he falls short of his own strict criteria for successful dialectic. Rocco cites 
the dialogue Gorgias as an interestingly stark example of Socrates clearly directing the 
dialogue, preventing the natural ebb and flow which he cherishes. From the beginning of the 
dialogue,235 Rocco argues, Socrates pulls on the reigns of the steeds which drive this 
dialogue, preventing it from going where it will by imposing his own preferred quick fire 
format on the conversation.236 Additionally, Socrates’ use of everyday examples such as 
cobblers237  or physicians238 and gymnasts239 to illustrate the points he makes results in an 
additional weight placed on Gorgias’ responses240 though his speech was famed for its 
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elaborate form (Socrates himself references this in Symposium.241 Rocco concludes that by 
setting such parameters Socrates demonstrates that genuine truly open search for truth is 
impossible through his methodology. As seen above in Phaedrus, Socrates does not leave his 
own conclusions unchallenged and instead is willing to modify his initial conclusions and 
refine his method. 
Wells’ characters may be accused of similar manipulation of the discussion though without 
any of the same willingness to accept their own mistakes. As was seen in Gorgias, though 
Socrates is the sole creator of the landscape (his dialectic), both Gorgias and he negotiate 
their path. On the other hand, in Wells’ utopian visions, the companions must either accept 
the unilateral, rigid system presented or be excluded. The system cannot be changed; Wells’ 
protagonist must be followed rather than accompanied into Utopia. This has the effect that - 
rather than an education in how things may be improved, the call seems instead to be for 
indoctrination.242 An instance where a character other than the protagonist offers a suggestion 
for improvement is found in the speech by Mr Catskill in Men Like Gods in which he decries 
the stiflingly safe life the Utopians have created for themselves (‘what do you know here of 
the sweet early days of convalescence?’).243 The aporia at the end of A Modern Utopia 
results from the stubborn refusal to review one’s arguments and seriously entertain the 
suggested improvements of others (rather than the outright removal of faith in one’s own 
argument which is the usual aporia formula at the end of the Platonic Dialogues) but may 
still be argued to be fundamentally Socratic. After all, both these aporiai follow the 
revelation that one’s own arguments are inadequate.  
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Where these aporiai differ is in the reactions they provoke. Socrates intends his confused 
interlocutors to realise that they must put all their beliefs through the rigours of dialectic to 
understand whether they are true. On the other hand, the Wellsian texts as illustrated by A 
Modern Utopia and Men Like Gods end with the protagonists being rejected from utopia and 
sent back to Earth. Wells’ novels do not end with an optimistic note looking forward to the 
possibility of improvement. Instead, there is a note of resignation and exasperation at a world 
which seems to precipitate the Socratic aporia; a world in which the population heedlessly 
runs along the well-worn tracks of belief without conceiving the possibility that their habits 
inhibit social progress. Socrates’ dialectic seems to anticipate and share the same conclusion 
implied by the destruction of Wells Utopia after the complete personalities of both the 
Botanist and Voice were inserted. This being that an ideal cannot be accurately understood by 
a single mind but, only through the presentation of one’s own understanding for the scrutiny 
of, and supplementation by the suggestions of, another mind can it be approached. One might 
read the Wellsian utopias as a warning of the problem that by fanatically holding to a certain 
idea, one is actually destroying it. Socrates’ dialectic demonstrates that an idea cannot be held 
in stasis but is dynamic and that concession does not necessitate its abandonment but instead 
its preservation and evolution. This is a fundamental difference between Plato’s dialogues 
and the Wellsian novels looked at here.  
The concluding stalemate is a result of conflict rather than for example, the mutual defeat 
which ends Lysis. As has been seen, Plato’s use of character allows a fuller debate than the 
one which takes place in A Modern Utopia. In the latter the conclusion is merely a rebuke of 
the vision put forward by the main protagonist, a fact which also stands true in Men Like 
Gods.  
In contrast, the dialogue of Plato’s characters and the ironic steering of Socrates means that 
the companion of Socrates may be introduced to the debate and contribute without being 
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berated by a protagonist indignant at having their beliefs questioned. This gives the dialogue 
a motion which allows it to possibly continue after the text. On the other hand, it is 
significant that the dialogue of A Modern Utopia ends “No! I can’t endure him. With a 
passionate rapidity of movement I leave his side”.244 To borrow the words of another “The 
Knowledge that philosophical dialogue imparts is that undisputed agreement is based on an 
illusion”.245 So whilst Plato’s dialogue sets the stage for continued debate, Wells’ blind and 
passionate dogmatism sets up the interlocutors as opponents rather than of companions in 
philosophy. By taking such an rigid position The Voice has ended all chance of continued 
philosophising once the narrative of the dialogue has left the interlocutors. This stunts the 
dialogue and removes it of its Platonic vitality ensuring that the Utopia will never arise from 
the rubble.  
On the other hand, one could argue the Wellsian aporia is actually more effective at 
stimulating further philosophising on utopianism than the endings of Plato’s dialogues. 
Whereas Socrates ends many of his dialogues with a light-hearted dismissal of their efforts 
(Lysis), a prayer (Phaedrus) or a mythical story (Republic) the acrimonious parting of the 
characters at the end of A Modern Utopia and Men Like Gods seems more desperate. In both 
of Wells’ utopian texts here mentioned the protagonists are forcefully ejected from utopia 
amid senseless conflict. Unlike the light-heartedness of Plato’s conclusions, Wells’ endings 
point to the shortfalls of the modern status quo with a passionate cry which leaves no doubt 
that the author believes that the current situation as it is cannot continue and must be changed 
for the better. We might argue that such violent frustration would be more effective in 
galvanising readers into continuing the philosophy than Socrates’, sometimes facetious but 
rarely desperate, endings. 
                                                            
244 Wells 2005: 242. 
245 Mittelstrass 1988: 128. 
Student Number: 795827 
57 
 
Deciding whether dialogues subsequent to Plato’s which lay claim to his philosophic legacy 
are actually faithful is not the aim of this chapter. As with the ontology of the ‘text’ looked at 
in the chapters preceding this one, the argument is that no part of the dialogues may be 
understood in isolation. What is gestured above is that Plato’s legacy as it appears in Wells’ 
visions, can help round off an understanding of the virtues of Plato’s Socrates’ choice to end 
in aporia and the form of the aporia he chooses. Thus the reader is warned against regarding 
the dialogues as separate from other contemporary philosophies, a single dialogue from the 
other dialogues within Plato’s corpus and, as has been seen in this chapter, a single character 
from the other characters – this applies both to interaction between Plato’s dialogues and the 
interaction between Plato’s dialogues and Plato’s literary legacy. This chapter has sought to 
demonstrate that splicing Plato’s dialogues to filter all speech other than the explicitly 
philosophic utterances of Socrates would fragment his philosophy. It has been shown that 
even dramatic interaction of the characters (such as Phaedrus’ light hearted and seemingly 
irrelevant mocking that Socrates is “like a visitor being shown the sights by a guide” when 
they walk in the Attic countryside)246 are equally relevant.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to explain how the use of the characters encountered in Plato’s 
dialogues assists to exemplify and temper the philosophy which their interaction produces. It 
has also been seen that simply producing two characters conversing about the given ideas is 
not sufficient and that an effort must also be made to preserve the natural flow of the 
conversation. This natural conversation incubates the insight into the truth of a concept and 
produces an idea which exists between the interlocutors rather than of either of them. By 
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preserving the independence of the conclusion, Plato ensures its existence beyond the reading 
of the text. Huxley and Wells have helped further the understanding of the ‘Platonic’ as it 
relates to the characters of a text by providing a negative definition, demonstrating what it is 
not and so complimenting the dialogues, making their achievement all the more remarkable 
by evidencing how every facet which the their dialogic format affords is delicately tuned to 
ensure the vitality and persistence of the dialectic they revere.  
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4. Aporia and the Conclusion of Utopia 
 
The aim of this dissertation has been to draw attention to the action which occurs around 
Socrates and how it compliments and expands the philosophy he explains and in this way 
provide a sharper understanding of the meaning of the ‘Platonic’. In the first chapter of this 
dissertation we saw how Plato’s significant choice of the sophist Gorgias for one of his 
dialogues and Gorgias’ own perspective of the nature of language (in speech and text) as well 
as the way it should be used hint at the meta-philosophy in which all the dialogues must be 
seen to participate. By acknowledging the role played by the writings of the historical person 
Gorgias, in the eponymous dialogue and in the arguments Socrates makes in Phaedrus, our 
understanding of the written word is expanded. The character of Gorgias utilises the mystical 
regard for language for its effect upon the souls of those nearby. In addition, the relevance of 
philosophies developed by other sophists pre-dating Plato such as Heraclitus and Parmenides 
was also detected. This all lends support to Gadamer’s own calls for the reader to always 
retain awareness that as a word functions as part of a sentence, so a single text functions 
within the author’s corpus as well as the wider tradition in which the author himself 
participates. 
A similar illumination of Socratic philosophy was also seen when we looked at Cratylus and 
the pregnant etymology of the word soma with its Orphic resonances. The eschatology which 
‘soma’ unlocks augments our understanding of the lifestyle of the Guardian class and their 
independent asceticism. The accompanying metaphysical individuality, by emphasizing that 
the route to a happy afterlife lies in a virtuous internal spiritual constitution outside of how 
the initiate participated in the rituals of State, helps further explain the possible role of the 
aporia. The aporia acts to dislodge the interlocutor from the unquestioning routine which 
they enacted and so offers them the opportunity to self-consciously assess the virtue of their 
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chosen course. Consciousness of the impermanence of the pervading system seen in the 
criticism of leading characters in modern utopian texts by Wells and Huxley have been 
chosen to help explain key ideas of the dialogues and their continued relevance.  
The frequent withholding of a constructive conclusion at the end of many of Wells’ utopian 
texts has been cited in support of the argument that through such endings Wells, as Socrates 
before him, was seeking to demonstrate that explanation should only be offered in a 
provisional and tentative manner flexible enough for embellishment and even opposition. 
Following on from this it has therefore been inferred that Wells understood the novel to be 
“an artefact to be perpetually renewed and reshaped”.247 This is where the aporia which 
evolves from such a dynamic understanding of the nature of the novel becomes Socratic. In 
both Phaedrus248 and Cratylus249 Socrates argues, as was seen above, that language is 
semantically fluid and the written word is unsuited to philosophy because of its inability to 
defend itself in the rigid form text lends to it. The solution Socrates identifies is endless 
philosophical endeavour or the perpetual renewal of understanding by means of dialectic with 
another philosophic mind.250  
The introduction of Heraclitus into the analysis of A Modern Utopia raises another interesting 
front on which Wells’ utopianism fails and is also indicative of one of the many unresolved 
conflicts which play themselves out through the text. In the opening lines of the first chapter 
on the Topography of his Utopia, Wells writes that it must not be static but must embrace 
change and be as a “hopeful stage leading to a long ascent of stages”.251 Despite this noble 
aim it is in this respect that the utopian bubble is burst. The tension in the fabric of the utopia 
which leads to its fracture may be argued to have arisen from the Voice’s refusal to 
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compromise on his vision of the utopia, thus instilling in its nature the kind of rigidity that 
Wells appears to be hoping to avoid. Waterfield sums up Heraclitus’ ideology saying that “it 
seems to be that there is harmonious give and take between the major stuffs of the world”.252 
This tandem of opposing forces is also mirrored in the dialectic of Socrates in Plato’s 
dialogues whose ‘give and take’ was the best way of gaining insights into the subjects under 
discussion. However, as we saw, sometimes Plato’s Socrates falls into didactic and subverts 
his own stated aims. 
 
Throughout this dissertation it has been emphasised that the closest certainty allowed to us is 
the beliefs of the characters who populate the dialogues; the Author himself remains hidden 
and this is because he never explicitly identifies with any of the characters. Another position 
presents itself despite arguments that Socratic irony and the repeated aporiai which conclude 
most of the dialogues demonstrate Socrates’ notorious assertion of ignorance, subverting any 
attempt to point to a ‘Socratic Doctrine’. Some have asserted that Socrates’ emphasis on 
Reason and the central objectivity of his realm of Forms means that Socrates believed there 
was a single Idea of Humanity.253 This makes understanding the mechanism of dialectic 
problematic because, if a life emulating the realm of Forms meant that every individual 
would think alike, how could the interchange of ideas which defines the dialogues and 
facilitates the philosopher’s life occur? Socrates raised the variety of human nature and 
interpretation as the impetus for his dialectic which would then lead to the epiphany 
described in the Cave metaphor. Plato’s possible belief in the dynamism of human 
interpretation is reinforced by two instances in the Republic; the first being the degradation of 
the Ideal Polis due to the irrepressible variety in human nature.254 The second comes slightly 
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earlier in the same text where Socrates explicitly acknowledges that there are actually “five 
types” of society corresponding to “five types of mental trait”.255 This reiterates the 
inconsistency of the dialogues and the Heraclitan belief of Plato’s Socrates that division is 
necessary for unity in human psychology as well as society.  Anecdotally, this can be 
illustrated in a story that tells how, upon Plato’s death, several different versions of the 
opening sentences of the Republic dialogue were found beneath his pillow.256 Whether true or 
not, this story illustrates the open, dynamic aporia of that dialogue and how it was intended 
to stimulate philosophising rather than stifle it with dogma. Here, again, the aporia provides 
the vitality and rigour at the centre of Republic’s philosophy. 
 
In the second chapter of this thesis257 the earthly companions of A Modern Utopia were 
interpreted as a manifestation of Wells’ psychological tension. This tension between what we 
believe to be good for humanity and the drivew to satisfy our own unique desires ultimately 
destroys many of Wells’ Utopian visions. But what has also been recognised is that, when the 
pristine towers began to topple it was Wells’ pen dealt the final blow because of his own 
dissatisfaction with his Utopia.258 As seen in A Modern Utopia the blow is dealt when Voice 
realises that the objective judgement of who would be appropriate as a member of the 
managerial class of Samurai and the consideration for the feelings of his friend the Botanist 
are incompatible. That said, in its ideas as well as the physical movement of the characters, 
the Utopia was an opportunity for Wells (through the persona of the Voice) to explore the 
nascent ideas he had about Utopia and judge the extent to which they belong in Utopia. It is 
this interplay of dialectic which afforded Wells the insight that his utopian vision was unfit 
for purpose.  
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Huxley conceded a similar, informal approach to his utopian and dystopian novels, stating 
that they were provisional and merely a safe environment in which he could release and 
observe the ideas he had.259 A similar interpretation of Plato’s dialogues has been maintained 
throughout this much larger exploration of Plato’s Socrates’ textual utopianism. This 
interpretation emphasizes that each dialogue is not self-sufficient in its teaching and that 
when taken together, the dialogues are not the finished article. This was demonstrated in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics when he wrote that anything said “must be taken with an infinity of 
what is not said”.260 By this Gadamer meant that in addition to the words of the author, the 
implications of the effect on the reader and their subsequent interpretation should also be 
born in mind when interpreting a text.261 It may therefore be understood that any text is 
provisional until it has been synchronised with the reader and the reader’s context though it 
would be premature to say that this is where the interpretive action ends. Gadamer goes on to 
suggest that because the audience is a condition of the text’s meaning, as the audience may 
evolve so the meaning of the text may evolve.262 Plato’s Socrates seems to acknowledge this 
state of perpetual flux when he argues against the perfect communicability of a single text263 
or his own self-deprecation at the end of many of the dialogues.264 We also saw that the 
conflict between the characters and the changes they undergo as the dialogues advance add an 
additional crucial perspective. 
 
It is debatable whether the dialogue between the Voice and the Botanist post-utopia at the end 
of A Modern Utopia may be branded ‘Socratic’. Though the competitive interplay of two 
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opposing ideologies does take place, it is not the Socratic dialogue which is reproduced but 
what one might call the Gorgiatic dialogue. Like Plato’s Socrates, Gorgias of Leontini also 
regarded the competition in the dialogue or ‘agon’ as the deliverer of truth.265 But unlike 
Plato’s Socrates, Gorgias did not place truth on an abstract plain separated from our own 
existence. For Gorgias (the historical person as opposed to the Platonic character), truth lay in 
the consensus of an expert audience’s support for the speaker’s argument.266 This is not to say 
that Gorgias was indifferent to truth but that, rather than being an autonomous entity 
independent of human cognition, truth actually lay in the ability of the experts in the field to 
convince and create consensus in the audience as to the virtue and truth of their argument.267 
In light of the polarity of argument in Wells’ conversational novels and the stubborn 
commitment each interlocutor has to their own vision it may be said that it is the conviction 
of the interlocutor’s audience which they seek rather than any personal open understanding of 
an esoteric truth. When held next to its Gorgiatic relative, the defining quality of the Socratic 
dialogue is that whereas for Gorgias two logoi are formulated and compellingly and 
competitively presented to the judges, the Socratic form instead seeks just one logos (since 
neither interlocutor offers the logos itself, only their notion of how to approach an 
understanding of it) and has no judge but the scrutiny of the dialectic. The Socratic dialogue 
seeks to dismantle the single Logos of Socrates’ interlocutor to approach what is understood 
to be the eternal abstract ideal of truth distilled of any temporal human understanding. It was 
this effect which the mechanism of the aporia sought to assist. The confusion and self-doubt 
incubated in the interlocutor’s confidence by the aporia in their interpretation of the given 
logos acted to subvert any ethical or intellectual complacency and so imparted a Socratically 
ironic perspective of all the assumed truths of society in the interlocutor. This form of irony 
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produced a keenly self-conscious perspective of the conditions of their social and ethical 
situation and in so doing, guided the mind to the abstract constancies in the Realm of Forms 
and its central tenet that Truth is only accessible through philosophising. Such a recalibration 
in the wider community seems to have been the aim of Socrates’ philosophising, it would 
have been very difficult to accomplish its objective without the use of aporia. 
The irony of the Socratic aporia is that it demonstrates the incompatibility of an ideal vision 
of society with any more people than the single individual who envisioned it. This is seen in 
A Modern Utopia when the second individual is introduced and the subsequent clash and re-
emergence of the aporia. An apparent solution would be to maximise the participation and so 
the variance in the dialectic of the utopian visions in order that a great consensus might be 
reached. Again, the dynamics of character in A Modern Utopia prove this to be insufficient 
since the will of the mass of society may be painful to the individual, as seen in the effect on 
the Botanist of the decision to pair the Botanist’s lover with the Botanist’s rival in the 
governing class of Samurai.268 This tension between the will of the masses and that of the 
individual also forms the foundational focus of A Brave New World in which the Savage’s 
Christian ethics and Shakespearian romanticism are consistently brought into conflict with 
the morality of the World State.269 Socrates also considers the tension between the will of 
society versus that of the individual when he concedes the paradox that no philosopher would 
wish to forego their inquiries in order to set up the Ideal State because of the possible price it 
would exact on their philosophic or ‘Socratic’ morality.270  
In the light of these considerations, the interpretation of the State of Republic as a State of 
Mind is the most compelling interpretation of what might be understood to be Socrates’ 
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utopia. This interpretation would invest a different but altogether more contemporary 
relevance in the aporia. From this interpretation the aporia is argued to be the device 
Socrates uses to open the gates of the ‘Good Place’ to his interlocutors and guide them 
through. Rather than the Sun in the Cave Metaphor,271 or the Guardians who govern his Polis 
- who are doomed to failure due to their inevitable moral degeneration272 - it is the aporia 
which may be understood to be Socrates’ ‘Good Place’, his Eutopia. With its associated self-
doubt and the prospect of endless philosophic inquiry the State of Mind is prevented from 
reaching the levels of complacency which precipitate the fall of the Ideal Polis of Republic.  
From this personalised interpretation it would seem that subsequent ‘institutionalised’ 
Utopias have missed the introspective emphasis entirely. As noted by Gadamer, the Greeks 
were the first to understand that “human experience of the world is linguistic”.273 By inducing 
aporia in his interlocutors and,  by extension, in his readers, Plato’s Socrates built the Utopia 
in this world without having to set a single brick. Taken in the context of Plato’s Socrates, the 
quotation above may be argued to say that the Greeks defined themselves or their ‘human 
experience’ not by the physical world or monuments but how they perceived it. External 
experience is determined by psychological understanding; the pretensions of a ‘Utopia’ are 
destroyed if,  as with Huxley’s world citizens’ singularly materialistic world-view, it is not 
understood as such. Thus the human physical experience is made redundant.  
Aporia at once builds utopia within our mind and so simultaneously raises its facade 
everywhere the interlocutor chooses to look. Human experience of the ‘real world’ filtered 
through aporia becomes utopia. The aporia of Plato’s dialogues may be argued to be the 
original and complete utopia whose fundamental success subsequently has been 
misinterpreted by later utopias. The reliance of Socrates’ State of Mind on the idiosyncrasies 
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of the Individual to fuel their aporia and the dialogue which takes place within it, carrying 
them to the next stage in its lifelong philosophising route is what has maintained the 
relevance of Plato’s dialogues and lent them their “art of strengthening”.274 The ultimate 
degradation of Socrates’ Ideal Polis275 is due to the complacence and disregard of the rules 
originally set down by Socrates and his interlocutors. This disregard is precisely what the 
irony and confusion raised by the aporia neutralise. The effects of the aproia urge us to 
constantly scrutinise the reasons for our actions. It was in opposition to the thoughtlessness 
which might otherwise arise that Socrates formed his dialectic method.  
Associating Utopia with the confusion of the aporia also associates it with the 
acknowledgement of personal ignorance which this reveals. The next logical step is that the 
association of Utopia with the ignorance exposed by the aporia is to associate it with, 
fundamentally, incompleteness. This evokes one of the acknowledged paradoxes (also 
discussed above) of Socrates’ simultaneous emphasis on both harmony and discord. His 
Apology is, after all, a warning of the stagnant harmony which would follow Athens’ swatting 
of its gadfly.276 A harmony which would lead to complacency and so abandonment of the 
pursuit of philosophic attitude embodied in Republic’s Guardians. Aporia is Socrates’ 
solution to the need to recognise the limits of one’s own knowledge and the need to 
constantly philosophise, a drug to maintain happiness or an efficient centralised record of all 
citizens completely misses the point. Aporia teaches that it is the way of thinking and self-
knowledge rather than laws and institutions that define the utopia. 
Therefore Aporia as understood above is the very act of philosophising. Defining Philosophy 
as either problem solving or the intellectual effort made to understand a problem means that 
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whichever way one turns, the existence of Philosophy rests on that of the problem. If the 
problem was ever removed then philosophy would cease. The possible model of 
complacency which could lead to its corruption is seen in the single minded pursuit of a very 
personal (read ‘Wellsian’) definition of pleasure without considering the possibility that the 
chosen course is incorrect and harmful. This removes the founding question of much of 
philosophy: how to live a good life? It is also reminiscent of the proto-community found at 
the beginning of Republic which Glaucon brands a “community of pigs”.277 Huxley’s Brave 
New World is a caricature of this call for universal provision and concerns itself with the 
question of what form humanity would take once all its needs could be satisfied.278 This sting 
of the gadfly which Socrates describes279 is arguably the sensation of the aporia, the 
confusion and sudden uncertainty bought on by Socrates’ questioning. This questioning and 
second guessing is intended to prevent us from passing the rest of our lives “in slumber”.280 
Huxley paints a pitiful consequence in the character of Linda who spends the last of her days 
in drug induced euphoria, taking refuge from the utopia and utopians which she once 
considered herself a part of. In her closing hours Huxley describes her “vaguely and 
uncomprehendingly smiling. Her pale bloated face bore an expression of imbecile 
happiness”.281 It could be easily argued that Socrates anticipated the Athenian citizens 
succumbing to such a state should they choose to execute him. 
These cannot have been the circumstances which Socrates (or Plato) aspired to. This 
therefore presents the understanding of the Republic and the philosophy of the dialogues as a 
whole as being one that promotes serenity of thought, clear of the distractions of competing 
passions. This in turn allows the person to view and consider the problems of the Kosmos 
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279 Plato Apology: 30e. 
280 Plato Apology: 31a. 
281 Huxely 1963: 158. 
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and to challenge and oppose others’ understanding in the arena of dialectic. If the dialogues 
are thus interpreted then the conclusion is left that the ‘Utopia’ which arises from the 
dialogues is not a ‘perfect’ place (in the sense of complete and self-sufficient) but one where 
there is still more work to be done.  
This dissertation brings together readings of the dialogues including perspectives of the 
presocratics, the school of hermeneutics, modern utopian texts and their corresponding 
perspectives of Socratic concepts. The aim has not been to isolate the most appropriate and 
effective of these readings but, rather, to emphasize the wider, synoptic context in which the 
dialogues must be read in order to understand what is meant by ‘Platonic’. We have seen that 
‘Platonic’ denotes not a single definitive dialogue, or all the dialogues, but the tradition which 
inspired them and the texts which hold them as precedent. However, by narrowing the focus 
to look at Socrates’ metaphors, his class system, his myths, ideal statesmen and realm of the 
ideas we risk forgetting the dependence all this places on dramatic, philosophic and religious 
precedents. This dissertation has sought to establish the wider country in which Plato’s 
dialogues may be understood to represent a single city with each of his subjects (text, 
statesmanship, love etc.) as single boroughs. Wells and Huxley helped to illustrate how, to 
continue the metaphor, the ‘city plan’ of Plato’s dialogues still informs other cities with its 
dramatic use of character, its dialogic speech and its fundamental dialectic. Additionally, and 
importantly, these texts also demonstrate how subsequent experimentation with ideas 
Socrates raises in the dialogues can help inform and improve our understanding of the 
dialogues. The use of character and a form of dialectic in both these texts illustrate to the 
reader that even the dialectic itself must be subject to a dialectic to ensure it is sound. 
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Phaedrus mocks Socrates for being a “stranger”282 in his own city, continuing “you don’t go 
outside the walls at all”.283 By taking such a specialised interest as described above without 
acknowledging the wider system, boundaries are being drawn around our understanding of 
Socrates. Instead, it is philosophy’s country in which he wanders, observing how virtuously 
the constitutions of other communities work, always with a glance over his shoulder at his 
own community. These wanderings would eventually lead him to the lawsuit brought by 
Meletus. By drawing boundaries around Socrates each time he describes a new idea the 
source of aporia is cut off and the reader is encouraged to believe that they understand what 
Socrates is saying. Gadamer states that to express meaning we “do not reflect beings but 
express a relation to the whole of being”284 and this “whole of being” is the blow with which 
Socrates stuns his interlocutors, forcing them to confront their own partial understanding in 
the light of the magnitude of this whole. This dissertation has sought to reemphasize the 
nature of the aporia and restore what can be lost in reading Platonic scholarship. 
 The aporia also holds the key to understanding the particular facet of Utopia in its ability to 
reinvent itself and endure. The passage of Philosophy is not a quest for the resolution of a 
problem but for a greater understanding of the problem and so a greater understanding of 
one’s situation.285 No matter what epoch a vision of Utopia is created in, it is fundamentally 
an effort by the individual to understand themselves in the contemporary society and how this 
understanding of the society will successfully communicate itself to posterity. These concerns 
are as immediate and common to each person in every generation and though asked 
uncountable times since two and a half millennia ago when Plato devoted his own thought to 
the utopian question, it has yielded different lessons and different conclusions. It is thanks to 
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283 Plato Phaedrus: 230d. 
284 Gadamer 2004: 465. 
285 Mittelstrass 1988:128. 
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Socrates’ legacy of aporia that Utopia has been able to reinvent itself and it is only through a 
continued aporia that Utopia can continue to reinvent itself and stay with us. In summary, 
when reading a detailed dissection of a single dialogue or feature within a dialogue (e.g. the 
etymological arguments of Cratylus or the Couch metaphor in Republic) we must not forget 
that it functions as part of a whole. As it affects the other ideas in the corpus, so the other 
ideas affect it. For example, we cannot completely understand Socrates’ treatment of the 
poets in Republic without reading Phaedrus and extracts from other dialogues. By leaving 
such an ideological ecosystem unacknowledged and by narrowing our vision to a single 
factor we run the risk of removing the aporia from its impetus. Without the aporia, the 
dialogues become static, we cease to question and Utopia decays. 
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